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Introduction: The contours of Contemporary Forced Labour in Brazil 
'[l]n various parts of Latin America, modernity is a fine veneer under which 
the old reality hides.'- Sergio Paulo Moreyra, Brazilian historian' 
In 1888 Brazil became the last country in the Americas to formally abolish 
chattel slavery; with the overthrow of the monarchy the following year, the new 
republic seemed poised to take its long overdue entry into the modern world. Yet 
a cursory glance at modern day Brazil reveals that many areas of society have not 
progressed much beyond 1889. There emergence of semi slavery in various parts 
of the country some four decades ago-assuming that such practices had ever 
actually ceased to exist in the first place-served to reinforce the notion that Brazil 
has not yet figured out how to fully extricate itself from the nineteenth century. 
A sizable majority of Brazilian forced labour (an estimated 72 percent2) 
occurs along the southern arc of the Amazon basin, in a vast and desolate region 
encompassing portions of the states of Para, Mato Grosso, Maranhao, Goias, Acre, 
Mato Grosso do Sui, and Tocantins. 3 The military government in the 1960s and 
1970s financed massive projects to open up the northern wilderness to take 
advantage of previously untapped economic potential and preclude incursions by 
would be foreign investors.4 Four of these Amazonian 'development' activities in 
particular have made heavy use of forced labour: forest clearing (including logging), 
cattle ranching and crop agriculture on cleared land, and charcoal production. 5 
Wealthy regional landowners (fazendeiros) provide the funding for and 
outline the objectives of the operations on their holdings (fazendas). These 
fazendeiros typically own several fazendas and engage in many business 
ventures simultaneously, and thus pay little attention to what goes on at any 
one fazenda. The fazendeiro delegates management authority to subcontractors 
(empreiteiros), who in turn hire their own subcontractors (known as gatos, or 
S P. Moreyra, 'lntrodu<;:ao', in Comissao Pastoral da Terra (ed.), Trabalho escravo no Brasil contemporaneo 
(1999), "11 at "12 (author's translation). 
R. Brasiliense, 'Pelourinhos nd florestd', Amazon Press, 2 December 2003, at http:// 
www.ama:wnpress.eom.br/manchete/dedoc/manch02122003a.htm (quoting figures compiled by Brazilian 
sociologist jose de Souza Martins). 
B. Le Breton, Vidas roubadas: A escravidao moderna na AmazOnia brasileira (2002), 228. 
See generally ibid., at 55-70. 
US Department of State~, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001: Brazil (2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/dri/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8305.htm. See also International Labour Organization, 
Stopping Forced Labour: Global Report Under the Follow up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work (2001), para. 67. Forced labour has also been discovered in other activities, such as 
sugarcane production, mining, factory work, and prostitution. See Human Rights Watch, Forced Labor in 
Brazil Re visited: On Site Investigations Document 1hat Practice Continues ( 1993), 2. 
316 
cats) to recruit workers and make sure they do their work 6 The hierarchy's 
deliberate obfuscation of knowledge and responsibility operates to insulate 
the fazendeiro from liability for labour abuses. 7 
Lower demand for coffee and sugar and their replacement with 
mechanised soybean production in the 1960s, combined with endemic drought 
in Brazil's impoverished Northeast, have produced a mass of wandering and 
unskilled labourers known as peoes de trecho. The gato specifically targets the 
poorest north-eastern states-especially Piauf and Maranhao-for potential 
recruits, enticing destitute pedes with false promises of lucrative gains and 
good working conditions.' The gato fronts the cost of transportation to the 
worksite and pays for food and lodging for the peoes along the way, creating 
from the very beginning a debtor-creditor relationship with the predominantly 
illiterate workers 9 
At the fazenda, three coercive ingredients combine to create forced-labour 
conditions. First, the (azenda is extremely remote, typically hundreds of miles 
from the place of recruitment and far from towns in the region; the fazenda's 
isolation and a paucity of transportation infrastructure deprive the worker of any 
geographical orientation and make it difficult to find help even if he manages to 
escape. 10 The second factor relates to the first: in the absence offeasible alternative 
sources, the worker must buy food, medicine, and work-related items at the 
company store located on the fazenda; the agent in charge of the store runs a tab 
for each worker, to be discounted from the worker's wages. The empreiteiros 
and gatos deliberately fashion the system so that the worker never makes enough 
in any given week to pay off his debt: he arrives at the fazenda already in debt, 
and must immediately make several credit purchases (including boots and 
chainsaws) at perhaps twice the goods' fair market value. 11 Moreover, according 
to Kevin Bales, the prevailing cultural attitude that '[a] man has to leave in the 
right way with his debts settled' injects an added element of coercion into the 
See LeBreton, supra note 3, at 77. 
SeeK. Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (1999), 143. 
D. Frigo, 'Denlmcia a ONU, Miseria, medo e cumplicidade: a receita do trabalho escravo no Brazil ' 
Testimony Before the 19th Session of the UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Geneva, 
April-May 1994, reprinted in A. Sutton, Trabalho escravo: Um elo na cadeia da modernizao;iio no Brasil de 
hoje (1994), 155, 157~159. 
R. Cunha, Untitled paper describing modt:rn slavery in Brazil (no year}, 2 {on file with author). Eighty four 
percent of the workers freed from forced~labour conditions by the Labour Ministry in 2002 were illiterate. 
U. Campbell, 'Aboli~§.o que nunca existiu', Correia Braziliense (Brasilia), 14 December 2003. 
'
0 R. Rezende Figueira, 'Trabalho escravo no Brasil', in Associa~ao dos Jufzes Federais do Brasil (ed.), Anais 
do 17° Encontro Nacional dos )ufzes Federais (2001), "105, 108. 
See Cunha, supra note 9, at 3; see also Bales, supra note 7, at 135. 
317 
relationship." Finally, if isolation and debt do not generate enough pressure to 
keep the worker from fleeing, armed gunmen patrol the worksite and shoot or 
otherwise physically abuse attempted deserters. 13 
Fa zenda agents care little, if at all, about the comfort and safety of the 
workers, and charcoal-making and deforestation are by nature very temporary; 
consequently, the peoes' shelter typically consists of dirt-floored plastic tents 
through which chickens, pigs, snakes, and malaria-infested mosquitoes pass at 
will. The work that the fazenda agents force the pe6es to do, moreover, presents 
hazards of its own for which pe6es almost never have protective gear, including 
chainsaw mishaps and mutilation by falling tree trunks in deforestation activities, 
and burns and smoke inhalation in charcoal operations. 14 When the peoes 
finally finish the job, fazenda agents do not take them back to Pi auf or Maranhao, 
but instead unload them in one of the towns in the region, either with no pay 
at all or with substantially less than what was promised." An alarming 
percentage of these ex forced labourers, unable to pay for the trip home and 
without alternative work options, ends up signing on with a subsequent gato, 
and the cycle repeats itself in perpetuity. 16 
The Pastoral Land Commission (Comissao Pastoral da Terral, the leading 
domestic nongovernmental organisation (NGO) dealing with labour exploitation 
in Brazil,17 estimates that at any given time some 40,000 Brazilians are working 
under conditions of forced labour,18 and University of Sao Paulo sociologist Jose 
de Souza Martins has set the number much higher at 85,000. 19 The Brazilian 
government has publicly admitted to the existence of 25,000 forced labourers, a 
" Ibid. at 136. According to one peiio, '[i]f a man owes money and he runs away, then of course they have to 
kill him. That's obvious.' LeBreton, supra note 3, at 180 (author's translation). 
'
1 See Cunha, supra note 9, at 3. A taskforce headed by Brazilian sociologist jose de Souza Martins, focusing 
on 475 forced-labour cases from the 1990s, came up with the following statistics: 20.7% of all forced 
labourers had been killed, 24.3% had been tortured, and 15.5% had been submitted to other types of 
humiliation, including sexual violence. Brasiliense, supra note 2. 
14 See Bales, supra note 7, at 130-131. 
Ll Cunha, supra note 9, at 3. ;~, Bales, supra note 7, at 129, 139. The rate at which ex forced labourers fall back 
into forced-labour situations is disturbingly high (at least 40 per·cent). See notes 144-148 and accompanying 
text, infra. 
16 Bales, supra note 7, at 129, 139. The rate at which ex forced labourers fall back into forced-labour 
situations is disturbingly high (at least 40 percent). See notes 144-"148 and accompanying text, infra. 
11 The CPT, which was set up by local Catholic bishops, uses its network of local churches and offices to 
investigate, document, and publicise situations of forced labour. LeBreton, supra note 3, at 145~146. See 
also P. Casaldaliga, Uma igreja da AmazOnia em conflito com o latiflmdio e a marginaliza,ao social 
(1972). 
1 ~ j. Sofia, 'Trabalho forr,:ado soma 12,3 mi de vilimas, diz 0\T', Fo\ha de Sao Paulo, 12 May 2005. See also 
l. Rohter, 'Jungle Slaves of the Amazon', N.Y. Times, 14 july 2002, 04. 
1 ~ Brazilians Chained to Job, and Desperate', N.Y. Times, 10 August 1995, A1. See also 0. G. Davidson, 
'Hearl of Darkness: Inside the Dangerous Race to liberate Tens of Thousands of Slaves in Brazil', Rolling 
Stone, 25 August 2005 (citing sources estimating the number of Brazilian forced labourers at 1 00,000). 
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figure which the International Labour Organization (ILO) has apparently accepted 
as reasonably accurate. 20 Despite its prevalence in the Amazon, however, very 
few Brazilians from the populous central and southern regions even know that 
forced labour still exists in their country; 21 moreover, those who are aware often 
take the common view that '[i]t's better to have some work than die for lack of it."' 
No one who appreciates the magnitude of the problem denies that forced 
labour, especially the brutal Amazonian variety, bears a strong resemblance to 
slavery, one of humankind's greatest abominations. And unfortunately Brazil 
is by no means the only country still suffering from this scourge: an ILO report on 
forced labour released in May 2005 asserts that at least 12.3 million people are 
victims of forced labour worldwide,23 and some of the more liberal estimates put this 
figure as high as 200 million." The modern manifestations of slavery take many 
different forms:25 vestiges of chattel slavery persist in Mauritania and Sudan;26 Southeast 
Asia, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere have borne witness to a dramatic increase in 
traffic in women and children for purposes afforced prostitution and work in factories 
or as domestic servants; and bonded labour endures in many parts of South Asia, 
particularly in India and Pakistan." The ILO has placed Brazil alongside Mauritania, 
Sudan, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Haiti, Peru, and the Dominican Republic as having 
one of the world's most serious forced-labour problems.28 
Yet even in the face of such alarming realities, public international lawyers 
seem to have largely ignored slavery and related practices in recent decades. 
With the noteworthy exception of the inclusion in the 1990s of enslavement, 
sexual slavery, and forced prostitution in the Statutes of the International 
10 See International Labour Organization, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report Under the 
Follow up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (200.'i), para. 190. 
21 Indeed, even high ranking govemment officials manifest a lack of awareness. For example, former Chief 
Labour judge Francisco Fausto openly admits that. prior to taking charge of the Superior Labour Tribunal 
(Tribunal Superior do Trabalho) in 2001, he was ignorant of forced labour's continued existence. Fausto 
has since become one of the most vociferous activists in Brazil's anti-forced-labour campaign. See R. 
Gomide, 'Confiscar terra, a nova lei Aurea: Entrevista com Francisco Fausto, presidente do Tribunal 
Superior do Trabalho', Jornal 0 Oia (Rio de janeiro), 23 November 2003. 
" Frigo, supra note 8, at 158 {author's translation). 
2
·
1 International Labour Organization, supra note 20, para. 37. 
24 See, e.g., A. Y. Rassam, 'Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution of the Prohibition of Slavery 
and the Slave Trade Under Customary International law', (1999) 39 Virginia journal of International Law 
303, at 305. 
21 See ibid. at 317,326-327. See aiso P. Venetis, 'International Sexual Slavery', (1997) 18 Women's Rights 
Law Reports 263, at 268-269. 
26 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Children in Sudan: Slaves, Street Children and Child Soldiers (1995), 
available at http://www.hrw .org/reports/1995/Sudan.htm. 
27 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Small Change: Bonded Child tabor in India's Silk Industry (2003), available 
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/india/; Human Rights Watch, Contemporary Forms of Slavery in Pakistan 
(1995), available at bttp://www,hrw,org/reports/1995/Pakistan.htm. 
28 LeBreton, supra note 3, at 233. 
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)29 and Rwanda (ICTR)/0 and 
that of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 31 the last substantial alteration to 
the international legal regime governing the manifestations of slavery took place 
in 1957.32 Most of the leading treatises on human rights law make extremely 
cursory mention of the subject, typically only in the context of the nineteenth-
century anti-slavery movement as an antecedent of modern human rights law 
or when citing the anti-slavery norm as an example of jus cogensY There is 
additionally a dearth of case law on slavery and forced labour, with just five 
relevant cases having come out of the European Court and Commission of 
Human Rights since the inception of the Council of Europe human rights 
system. 3' Fuelling the misconception that slavery has been 'dealt with' may 
be the fact that international stigmatisation of traditional chattel slavery and 
the African slave trade in the nineteenth century led long ago to a remarkably 
positive outcome. 35 Both have been almost universally abolished in national 
legal systems for more than 100 years, 36 and their occurrence in the modern 
day has dwindled to relatively few cases (for example, in Sudan and Mauritania) 
notwithstanding the absence of international enforcement machinery37 
Even international criminal law scholars fail to fully acknowledge the 
contemporary relevance of slavery and related practices. M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
for example, produced a draft international criminal code and commentary in 
1987 in which the section entitled 'Slavery and Related Crimes' appears as a 
-,
9 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, SC Re~. 827, UN Doc. S/RES/827 
(1993), Annex, Arts. 2(e), 5(c), reprinted in (1993) 32 ILM 1203 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
30 Statute of the lnternalional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res. 955, UN Doc. 5/RES/955 (1994), 
Annex, Arts. 3(c), 4(e), reprinted in (1994) 33 ILM 1602 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
31 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 july 1998, Arts. 7("1 )(c), 7{1 )(g), 8{2)(b)(xxii), 
UN Doc. A/CON F. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
31 1957 Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour {No. 105), 25 june 1957, 320 UNTS 291 
[hereinafter 11..0 Convention No. "105]. 
:n See, e.g., H.). Steine1· and P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 127 
{2000) (1,497 pages with a single mention of slavery and slave trade and no mention of forced labour); 1... 
B. Sohn and T. Buergenthal, International Pmtection of Human Rights (1973) (1,402 pages with a handful 
of passing references to anti--slavery conventions and the anti-slavery norm as jus cogens); A. Cassese, 
Human Rights in a Changing World (1990) (two mentions of slavery, no mention of forced labour, in 245 
pages); H. l..auterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1968) (475 pages with a single page-and-a-
half discussion of slavery and forced labour in the context of the International Bill of the Rights of Man); T. 
Buergenthal and D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas (1995) (single mention of slave 
trade, no mention of slavery or forced labour, in 692 pages). For a noteworthy exception to this general 
trend of neglect of slavery and forced labour, seeM. S. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public 
Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (1980), 475-508 (extensive 34-page 
analysis of evolution of anti-slavery and anti-forced-labour human rights regimes) . 
.1·: See notes 84-88 and accompanying text, infra. 
35 See 0. Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (1992), 148-171. 
Jr, See note 52 and accompanying text, infra. 
v M. C. Bassiouni, International Criminal taw Conventions and Their Penal Provisions (1997), 638 [hereinafter 
Bassiouni 1997]. 
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verbatim copy of the same section from his 1980 code, 38 despite at least one 
significant development in the interim: in 1983 the European Court of Human 
Rights had occasion to construe the forced-labour provision in the European 
Convention, 39 partially overruling a previous Commission case which Bassiouni 
cites-in 1980 as well as in 1987 -as authoritative." In similar fashion, Professor 
Bassiouni published an article in 1991 comprehensively laying out the 
international conventions touching on slavery and related practices, mentioning 
enslavement as a crime against humanity and a war crime in the Nuremberg41 
and Tokyo Charters42 but, of course, making no mention of the not yet existing 
Statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC. He reproduced this article word 
for word in a chapter of a book released in 1999, omitting all reference to the 
slavery-related provisions which appear in the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC Statutes, all 
of which existed by 1999.43 And Professor Bassiouni is not alone: notwithstanding 
the status of slavery and the slave trade as two of the very first international 
crimes, none of the international conventions criminal ising slavery, the slave 
trade, or forced labour appear in Christine van den Wyngaert's seemingly 
comprehensive collection of instruments on international criminal law.44 
This article proceeds in Section 1 with a discussion of the very much 
neglected international legal regime governing slavery in its many manifestations 
when committed during peacetime. Specifically, it traces the contours of the 
slavery-related activities proscribed by conventional and customary international 
law, examining under which circumstances state responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility may be engaged for the occurrence of such activities. 
38 Compare M. C Bassiouni, International Criminal law: A Draft International Criminal Code (1980) with M. C. 
Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International Crimina! Tribunal 
(1987). 
39 1950 Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,4 November 1930, Art. 
4(1), 213 UNTS 221 l"hereinafter ECHR]. 
4° Compare Vander Mussele v. Belgium, [1983] 70 ECHI\ (Ser. A) with Iversen v. Norway, Appl. No. 1468/62 
(EUI·. Comm'n H.R.), (1963) 6 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 278--332. See 11otes 
84-88 and accompanying text, infra, for a more detailed discussion of these cases. 
~ 1 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major War Criminals, appended to Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, Art. 
6(b)-(c), 59 Stat. 1544, as amended, Protocol to Agreement and Charter, 6 October 1945 [hereinafte1 
Nuremberg Charter]. 
41 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 january 1946 {General Orders No. 1 ), Art. 
S(c), as amended, General Orders No. 20, 26 April1946, T!AS No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 [hereinafter Tokyo 
Charter]. 
43 Compare M. C. Bassiouni, 'Enslavemenl as an International Crime', (1991) 23 NYU journal of International 
Law and Politics 445 [hereinafter Bassiouni 1991] with M. C. Bassiouni, 'Enslavement', in M. C. Bassiouni 
(E'd.), International Criminal Law (1999), Vol. 1, at 663. 
44 See C. van d~m Wyngaert (ed.), International Crimina! law: A Collection of International and European 
Instruments {2005). 
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The horrendousness of the human rights violations taking place in the 
Amazon has in the past 15 years drawn the focused attention of human rights 
advocates, Western powers, and potential investors. As a consequence, and 
after a great deal of recalcitrance, in the mid 1990s the Brazilian government 
finally began to invest human and financial resources into coming up with 
viable plans to solve the problem. Section 2 begins by discussing the innovative 
anti-forced-labour initiatives of the Fernando Henri que Cardoso (1995-2002) 
and Luiz lnacio Lui ada Silva (2003- present) administrations. Subsection 2.2 
then explains how, due to a number of domestic political variables-such as 
the apathy and complicity of the federal and state judiciaries and the fazendeiros' 
pervasive influence in the national Congress-Brazil's laudable efforts have 
actually had little success in stamping out forced labour. 
Section 3 commences with an examination of Brazil's potential state 
responsibility under international law. Specifically, it looks at whether Brazil 
could be held responsible for violating its obligations under the anti-slavery 
and human rights conventions to which it is a party, despite limited resources, 
other arguably more pressing human rights crises elsewhere in the country, 
the apparently private commission of the violations, and the extreme difficulty 
of monitoring and policing such remote and transitory activities. The section 
then proceeds to question whether holding the Brazilian state responsible and 
assessing monetary damages is in fact the most effective and fair way of dealing 
with the problem, and suggests that international criminal sanctions for the 
individual perpetrators of forced labour-and perhaps even prosecution in the 
ICC for crimes against humanity-could be a viable and preferable alternative. 
To this end, Subsection 3.2.2 explores the relatively meagre body of case law 
of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals-originating exclusively from 
the ICTY in just two cases-construing 'enslavement' as a crime against 
humanity.45 
By way of conclusion, this article then discusses the broader implications 
for the international human rights movement of using international criminal 
law as a supplement or substitute for human rights law in curbing abuses 
endemic to the more remote and lawless corners of the globe. 
45 See ICTY Statute, supra note 29, Art. 5(c); ICTR Statute, supra note 30, Art. 3(c). See also Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, Kovae, and Vukovi<e, judgement, Case No. IT~96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 22 February 2001 [hereinafter 
Kunarac et al. Trial judgment]; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, judgement, Case No. IT-97-25-T, 15 March 2002 
[hereinafter Krnojelac Trial judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovae, and Vukovize, Judgement, Case No. 
!T-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 12 june 2002 [hereinafter Kunarac et al. Appeal judgment]; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, 
judgement, Case No. IT-97-25-A, 17 September 2003 [hereinafter Krnojelac Appeal judgment]. 
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1. The international legal regime governing slavery and related 
activities 
1.1. Slavery, the slave trade, slavery-like practices, and forced labour as 
internationally wrongful acts entailing state responsibility 
1.1.1. Specific instruments dealing with slavery-related activities 
Through an ongoing process which began in the early nineteenth century, 
the international community has issued a multitude of international declarations 
and conventions condemning various aspects of slavery and other coercive 
labour arrangements. Although several nineteenth-century instruments had 
outlawed the slave trade,'6 the first instrument to deal comprehensively with 
slavery continues to be the central convention on the subject: the 1926 League 
of Nations Slavery Convention." Nevertheless, while the Convention's 
command to states parties to suppress slavery 'in all its forms'48 appears at first 
glance to encompass a broad range of conduct, the Convention's rather 
restrictive definition of 'slavery' in Article 1 (1) effectively confines that which 
is prohibited to chattel slavery only: 'Slavery is the status or condition of a 
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
are exercised.'49 Moreover, the Convention bans forced labour exacted by non 
public entities, but it does not ban the practice for public purposes, merely 
cautioning states to take all necessary measures so that forced labour does not 
devolve into 'conditions analogous to s!avery'.50 
46 See 1815 Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade, 8 February 1813, 63 Consol. 
TS No. 473 (condemning the slave trade as 1repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality'); 
1841 Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, 20 December 184"1, Art. 1, 92 Consol. TS No. 
437 [hereinafter 1841 Treaty of London] (obliging states parties to 'prohibit all trade in slaves .. and to 
declare such traffic piracy'); 1890 Convention Relative to the Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of 
Firearms, Ammunition, Spirituous Liquor, 2 july 1890, Arts. Ill, Xlll, 27 Stat. 886, TS No. 383 [hereinafter 
1890 Brussels General Act] (banning slavery and the slave trade without defining them, and establishing a 
procedure for inspection, seizure, and adjudication of ships suspected of carrying slaves). 
'
7 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, 25 September 1926, 212 UNTS 17 [hereinafter 
1926 Slavery Convention]. The 1926 Slavery Convention contains only 12 articles. 
-1B Ibid., Art. 2(b). 
"~ Ibid., Art. 1(1). This definition has remained authoritative up to the present day, making its most recent 
appearance in the crimes-against-humanity provision of the 1998 Rome Statute. Article 7(2)(c) defines 
'enslavement' as the 'exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person 
and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children.' Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art. (7)(2)(c). 
ou Ibid., Art 5. Subsequent to the 1926 Convention, 'conditions analogous to slave1y' became a term of art, 
proscribed in many states' national laws and defined in considerable detail in Article 149 of the Brazilian 
Penal Code. See notes 158-162 and accompanying text, infra. 
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While chattel slavery and the slave trade still exist today-particularly 
in Sudan," Mauritania, and other parts of the Middle East and Africa-these 
two most traditional of the manifestations of slavery have largely receded 
in the wake of nineteenth-century national abolitions and the anti-slavery 
and anti-slave-trade conventions." Notwithstanding this remarkable 
progress, 53 however, a joint UN ILO report produced shortly after the 1953 
Protocol to the Slavery Convention" came into force revealed that less-
straightforward guises of slavery continued to flourish in many parts of the 
world. 55 In response, states in 1956 adopted the UN Supplementary Convention 
on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery.56 Intended as a supplement to the 1926 Convention, the 
1956 Convention reaffirms the ban on chattel slavery57 and the slave trade, 58 
and further binds states parties to take measures to curb the so called 'institutions 
and practices similar to slavery', also known as 'slavery-like practices'; such practices 
exhaustively include debt bondage, serfdom, compulsory marital arrangements, 
and the sale of children into labour. 59 The Convention labels the victims of slavery-
like practices 'persons of se!Vile status'.60 
1
' See, e.g., Interim Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan Pr(~pc<red by Mr. Gaspar Biro, 
Special RaiJporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in Accordance with Commission Resolution 
1995/77 of 8 March 1995, UN Doc. A/50/569 (1995). 
'
2 Rassam, supra note 24, at 317. See also 'Suppression of Slavery', (1931) 2 Geneva Special Studies No. 4, at 
4. The following yQars of formal abolition of chattel slavery in various states and territories reveal a domino 
effec1, starting with Britain and France: Britain (1772; 1833 in 1he colonies); France (1791; 1848 in the 
colonies); Austria (1811); Chile (1811); Peru (1821 ); Guatemala (1824); Dominican Republic (1844); Tunisia 
(1846); Sweden (1846); Denmark {1848); Hungary (1848); Ecuador (1851); Argentina (1853); Venezuela 
(1854); Portugal (1856); Russia (1860); Netherlands (1863); United States (1865); Cuba (1866); Pue110 Rico 
(1872); Brazil (1888); Egypt (1896); Siam (1905); China (1909). See Bassiouni 1991, supra note 43, at 451-
452; see also McDougal et al., supra note 33, at 490-491; US Constitution, amendment XIII. 
'J Professor Bassiouni hails slavety as unique among international crimes in that its near eradication has 
occurred without reliance on an international enforcement mechanism. He attributes this phenomf·~non to 
the coalescence and concurrence of 'the commonly shared values of the international community ... with 
the political will of states.' Bassiouni 1997, supra note 37, at 638. 
14 1953 Protocol to the 1926 Slavery Convention, 7 December 1953, 2"!2 UNTS 17. The 1953 Protocol 
substituted UN agents and institutions for the league of Nations agents and institutions that appear in 
the 1926 text. 
5
' Rassam, supra note 24, at 331. 
56 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery, 7 September 1956, 226 UNTS 3 [hereinafter 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention]. 
57 Ibid., Arts. 5-6. 
~~ Ibid., Art. 3. 
09 Ibid., Art. 1 (a)-(d). 'Debt bond<:Jge' is 'the status 01" condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his 
personal services or of tho~e of a person under his control as security for a debt. 1 Ibid., Art. r (a). 'Serfdom' 
is 'the condition or status of a tenant who is by iaw, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land 
belonging to another person and to render some determinate seNice to such other person.' Ibid., Art. l(b). 
Proscribed compulsory marital arrangements include those in which '[a] woman .. is promised or given in 
marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind, ... a husband ... has the right to transfer [his 
wife], or on the death of het" husband, a woman is liable to be inherited'. Ibid., r\rt. 1 (c). 
w Ibid., Art. 7. 
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As concerns state responsibility for perpetuating or permitting functional 
approximations to slavery, the 1956 Convention suffers from two major flaws 
that substantially reduce its effectiveness. First, the Convention does not oblige 
states parties to eliminate the four categories of proscribed conduct immediately, 
but merely calls on them to take 'all practicable and necessary legislative . 
measures to bring about progressively and as soon as possible' the abandonment 
of such practices. 61 Secondly, the list of prohibited conduct is exhaustive, 
including only the four categories enumerated in Article 1 and leaving many 
other coercive practices untouched. Indeed, it would appear that the 1956 
Convention does not prohibit the type of labour arrangement prevalent in the 
Brazilian Amazon. 'Debt bondage' requires a voluntary pledge by the debtor 
of his personal services as security for an existing debt. 62 By contrast, when 
Brazilian workers sign up to work at a given fazenda, they do not yet owe 
money to the fazendeiro; the debt arises later when, to his surprise, the worker 
must purchase the needed food, clothing, and equipment on credit. Only then 
does the worker perform his duties in order to liquidate an existing debt, and 
he must render such services whether he wants to or not. 
The 1926 Slavery Convention is the first international instrument to deal with 
forced labour, providing in Article 5(1) that 'compulsory or forced labour rnay only 
be exacted for public purposes.'63 Article 5(2) makes an exception, however, for 
'territories in which compulsory or forced labour for other than public purposes still 
survives', but even in such territories forced labour must be of an exceptional character 
and adequately remunerated. 64 Moreover the Convention, by calling on states parties 
to 'take all necessary measures to prevent compulsory or forced labour from 
developing into conditions analogous to slavery', seems to recognise that forced 
labour does not suffer from the same level of egregiousness as slavery.65 
ILO Convention No. 29 of 193066 prohibits the use of forced or 
compulsory labour for non-public purposes in no uncertain terms, and calls 
upon states to suppress all public forms of such labour 'within the shortest 
possible period.'67 It defines 'forced or compulsory labour' as 'all work or service 
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for 
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.'68 Article 2 proceeds, 
01 ibid., Art. 1 (emphasis add(:>d). 
"
1 Ibid., Art. 1(a). 
~>J 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 47, Art. 3(1). 
1
"' Ibid., Art. 5(2). 
05 Ibid., Art 5; see also ibid., pmbl. 
66 1930 Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29), 28june 1930, 39 UNTS 55 [herein<lfler 
ILO Convention No. 29]. Almost from th(o moment of its inception, the ILO began a rigorous and stili-
ongoing campaign to curtail and ultimately eliminate the use of forced labour in the world. 
o1 Ibid., Art. 1(1)-(2). 
r,o Ibid., Art. 2(1 ). 
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however, to exempt a number of practices from the purview of forced or 
compulsory labour, including mandatory military service, work which forms 
part of normal civic obligations, hard prison time, and work exacted in situations 
of emergency.69 In all other cases where public officials have recourse to forced 
or compulsory labour, Convention No. 29 imposes important restrictions by, 
for example, limiting those who can be called upon to work to able-bodied 
adult males, and mandating that the working hours and pay of forced labourers 
be comparable to those of free labourers performing the same job.70 
Nearly three decades after Convention No. 29 the ILO produced a 
supplementary forced-labour convention-Convention No. 105 of 195771 -in 
response to the findings of the UN ILO Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour 
that many states had been using 'corrective' forced labour as a means of political 
coercion 72 The Convention obliges states parties to adopt effective measures 
for the immediate and complete abolition of any form of forced or compulsory 
labour for certain specified purposes, including as a means of coercion or 
political education; workplace discipline; social, national, or religious 
discrimination; as a method of mobilisation and utilisation of labour for 
economic means; or as a punishment for having participated in strikes/3 
1.1.2. General human rights treaties proscribing slavery-related activities 
Several of the general international human rights instruments contain a 
prohibition on slavery and the practice deemed 'servitude'. Article 4 of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that '[n]o one 
shall be held in slavery or servitude', and that 'slavery and the slave trade shall 
be prohibited in all their forms.' 74 Likewise, the 1966 International Covenant 
for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)/5 as well as the 1969 American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR), 76 forbid slavery, the slave trade, and servitude, and 
the ACHR goes further to prohibit 'traffic in women'. Curiously, the analogous 
provision of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 77 makes 
no specific mention of the slave trade, although its proscriptions of slavery 
1>9 Ibid., Art. 2(2)(aHel. 
7n !bid .. Arts. 11("!), 13(1), 14(1). 
ILO Convention No. 105, supra note 32. 
72 See United Nations and International Labour Office, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour, 
UN Doc. E/2431 (1953). 
73 ILO Convention No. 105, supra note 32, Art. 1 (a)~( e). The Convention's preamble reiterates the plea of the 
1926 Slavery Convention fm st2tes to take all necess2ry measures to prevent forced labour from degrading 
into conditions analogous to slavery. lbid.,pmbL 
74 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A, Art 4, UN GAOR, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). 
'~ 1966 International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Arts. 8(1)·-(2), 999 UNTS 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
16 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, Art. 6(1), 1144 UNTS 123 [hereinafter ACHRJ. 
77 ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 4(1). 
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and servitude doubtless imply the impermissibility of the slave trade. 78 All three 
conventions disallow derogation from the anti-slavery and anti-servitude norms 
in times of public emergency." Moreover, while neither the UDHR nor any of 
the general human rights conventions define slavery or servitude, the travaux 
preparatoires of the ICCPR suggest that the drafters intended servitude to be a 
more flexible notion than slavery, encompassing the 'slavery-like practices' 
defined in the 1956 Supplementary Convention and possibly extending to other 
severe forms of domination of one human being over another.80 
The ICCPR, ECHR, and ACHR each contain an explicit prohibition on forced 
or compulsory labour." Nevertheless, following the example of Conventions No. 
29 and 105, the prohibition is not absolute, and the three conventions all contain 
essentially the same list of exemptions as that laid out in Convention No. 29.82 The 
strength of the anti-forced-labour norm in the ICCPR and ECHR is further weakened 
by its derogability in times of public emergency; perhaps owing to Latin America's 
unhappy history with abusive invocations by public officials of emergency powers, 
only the ACHR forbids derogation from the anti-forced-labour norm as well as the 
anti-slavery, anti-slave-trade, and anti-servitude norms.83 
As with slavery and servitude, none of the conventions defines 'forced or 
compulsory labour'. The European Court of Human Rights had a rare opportunity 
to elaborate on the substance of the practice, however, in the 1983 case of Van 
der Mussele v. Belgium." In conformity with Article 2(1) of Convention No. 29, 
7~ McDougal et al., supra note 33, at 502. 
79 !CCPR, supra note 75, Art. 4(2); ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 15(2); ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 27(2). 
Additionally, the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights contains a general provision forbidding 
'all forms of degradation of man', including slavery and the slave trade, but makes no specific mention of 
servitude. 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 27 june 1981, Art. 5, Doc. OAU/CAB/LEG/ 
67/3/Rev.S, {1982) 21 !LM 59. 
110 See Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, 10 UN GAOR, Annexes 
(Agenda Item 28) 33, UN Doc. N2929 (1955). See also M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, CCPR Commentary 148 (1993); N. Lassen, 'Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices: United Nations 
Standards and Implementation', (1988) 57 Nordic journal of International Law 197, at 207 (outlining the 
slavery-like practices identified in the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention). The Human Rights 
Committee viewed US proposals to substitute the term 'se1vitude' in the ICCPR with 'peonage or serfdom' 
or 'involuntary servitude' as too narrow because they would fail to protect individuals who voluntarily 
contract themselves into bondage. Nowak, supra, at 148. 
~ 1 ICCPR, supra note 75, Art. 8(3); ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 4(2); ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 6(2). 
BL ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 66, Art. 2(1)(a)-(e); ICCPR, supra note 75, Art. S(3)(c)(i)-(iv); ECHR, 
supra note 39, Art. 4(3)(a)-(d); ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 6(3)(a)-(d). Those exemptions are compulsory 
military service, hard labour, service exacted during times of national emergency, and any other work or 
service that forms part of normal civic obligations (for example, jmy duty). See also ILO Convention No. 
29, supra note 66, Art. 2(2)(a)-(e). 
83 Ibid., Art. 27(2). 
B4 Vander Mussele v. Belgium, supra note 40. The Court noted that it would rely on Convention No. 29 in 
interpreting Article 4 of the ECHR, especially since the architects of the ECHR had had that convention in 
particular mind during the drafting process. lbid.,para. 32. 
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for a given labour situation to constitute a violation of ECHR Article 4 it must be 
exacted under the menace of a penalty and against the will of the person 
concerned.85 Hence, a work obligation based on a prior contract or other voluntary 
agreement probably does not amount to forced or compulsory labour.36 Moreover, 
according to the European Court, the coercion exerted upon the worker need 
not be physical: mental constraint may also lead to forced labour.87 Such constraint 
almost certainly includes the psychological pressure placed upon Brazilian 
labourers by indebting them to the fazendeiro. In addition, in certain 
circumstances even remunerated work can fall into the category of 'forced or 
compulsory', particularly if the duties performed are excessive or disproportionate 
to the advantages attached to the profession.88 
Upon examination of the general and specific human rights conventions 
which deal in some way with the various manifestations of slavery, one can clearly 
identify a hierarchy whereby the more egregious deprivations of human liberty 
and dignity engage more absolute proscriptions. Thus, slavery and the slave trade 
are prohibited in all circumstances, with no exceptions or derogations. Slavery-
like practices and servitude also permit no derogations, but the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention only enumerates four broad categories of such practices, and merely 
obliges states to take 'practicable' measures to do away with the practice 'as soon 
as possible'.89 And while international agreements place strict limitations on states' 
use afforced labour and prohibit its use for non state entities and private individuals, 
they do not ban it outright: the ICCPR and ECHR allow derogations in times of 
public emergency, and all formulations exempt certain practices from forced 
labour's scope. Moreover, forced or compulsory labour requires involuntariness; 
by contrast, potential victims of violations of the 1956 Supplementary Convention-
such as those willing to contract themselves into bondage in order to pay off an 
existing debt-enjoy protection whether or not they offer themselves voluntarily 
for the bonded condition. 
35 !bid., para . .34. 
1\6 'Comment', in R. A. Lawson and H. G. Schermers (eds.), Leading Cases of the European Court of Human 
Rights (1999), 143. 
~7 Vander Mussele v. Belgium, supra note 40, para. 33. 
~6 Ibid., paras. 36, 40. See also 'Comment', supr-a note 86, at 143. While Article 4 cases are rare, the European 
Court and Commission have construed the provision on at least four other occasions. See Iversen v. Norway, 
supra note 40; X v. the NethPrlands, Appl. No. 7602/76 (Eur. Comm'n H.R.), [1976] 7 Dl~ 161~163; Van 
Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, [1982] 50 ECHR (Ser. A); Schmidtv. Germany, [1994]291-B ECHR (Ser. A). See 
also Marfa Mejia v. Guatemala, Case 10,553, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/11.95, doc. 7 rev. at 370 
(report no. 32/96) (1997). 
8~ 1956 Supplementary Slave1y Convention, supra note 56, Art. 1. 
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1.1.3. Slavery-related activities under customary international law 
No state today claims the right to make use of slavery, the slave trade, or 
slavery-like practices. National laws and a multitude of international declarations 
and conventions (including international humanitarian law conventions90) 
denounce these activities, and their perpetration has dwindled to relatively 
few acts carried out by private individuals. These developments leave little 
room for doubt that the requisite state practice and opinio juris exist to place 
the norms against slavery, the slave trade, and slavery-like practices squarely 
within the realm of customary international law." Accordingly, any state 
acquiescence in slavery, the slave trade, or slavery-like practices gives rise to 
state responsibility, regardless of whether the state has ratified any of the 
applicable conventions." 
Based on this universal condemnation, the International Court of justice 
has singled out slavery, along with protection frorn racial discrimination, as 
examples of rules concerning the basic rights of the human person that give 
rise to obligations erga omnes, that is, 'obligations of a State toward the 
international community as a whole'. 93 As a consequence any state in the world, 
and not just a state whose national has fallen victim to an act of enslavement, 
has standing to invoke the offending state's responsibility. 94 Furthermore, slavery, 
the slave trade, and slavery-like practices have almost certainly joined the ranks 
of torture, piracy, and genocide as jus cogens violations/5 especially given 
90 See, e.g., 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 
1949, Art. 147, 75 UNTS 287 (listing compelled service of a pmtected person in the forces of a hostile 
power as a grave breach); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Pmtection of Victims of Non International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), 12 December 
1977, Art. 4(2)(f), 1125 UNTS 609 ('slavery and the slave trade in all their forms. are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever'). 
9
' See Bassiouni 1991, supra note 43, at 445. 
92 See Report of the Working Group on Contempmaty Forms of Slavery on Its Twenty first Session, UN Doc. E/ 
CN.4/Sub.2/1996/24 (1996), at 21. 
9
-' Barcelona Tradion, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (2d Phase} (Belgium v. Spain}, judgment of 5 Februa1y 1970, 
[1970]1CJ Rep. 3, at 32. The Court additionally included the norms against genocide and aggression as 
giving risp to erga omnes obligations. Ibid. 
9
'' Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for lntemationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the lntemational Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty third Session, Art. 48, UN Doc N56/1 0 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. 
95 The term 'jus cogens' refers to a group of peremptory norms in cu~tomary international law that are so 
important to the international community that they remain binding notwithstanding any agreement to the 
contrary. 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Art. 53, (1969) 8 ILM 679, at 698. 
See also Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session and on 
its Eighteenth Session, UN Doc N6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in (1966) 2 Year·book of the International 
Law Commission 247-248 (including anti-slavery norm in the list of jus cogens norms); Restatement (Third) 
of the Foreign Relations Law of 1he United States § 702 cmt a (1987) (recognising 1he prohibition against 
slavery and the slave trade as jus cogPnS norms} [hereinafter Restatement]; United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 
71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing t01ture, murde1·, genocide, and slavery as jus cogens 
no1msJ; Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d. Cir. -1980) (calling the slave trader 'hostis human is 
generis'-an enemy of all mankind}. 
329 
that none of the specific or general human rights instruments allows derogation 
from the norms prohibiting them. 96 
The norm prohibiting forced labour likely also forms part of customary 
international law, but in less absolute terms than the norms against slavery, the 
slave trade, and slavery-like practices.97 A sizable majority of states has ratified 
Conventions No. 29 and 105 (indeed, they are the two most widely ratified of 
the ILO's 185 conventions98), and few states make use of or acquiesce in forced 
labour that does not fall into one of the exemptions allowed by the ILO 
Conventions and the general human rights instruments99 Nevertheless, while 
several authorities have summarily asserted that the anti-forced-labour norm 
rises to the level of jus cogens, 100 and forced labour in violation of Conventions 
No. 29 and 105 probably constitutes an international crime, 101 it is actually 
quite questionable whether the norm enjoys peremptory status. One of the 
central attributes of a jus cogens norm, in terms of Article 53 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is that it allows for no derogation. 102 
The ICCPR and ECHR-but, importantly, not the ACHR-allow for derogation 
from the anti-forced-labour norm in times of public emergencyw3 
% ICCPR, supra note 75, Art. 4(2); ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 15(2); ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 27(2). 
~7 SeeR. jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International law (1992), 982. See also Rassam, supra 
note 24, at 308; M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal law (1999), 309 ('No 
one could doubt ... that even before 1945, submitting a person to slavery or slave-related practices, including 
forced labor, constituted a violation of "general principles of law".'). 
98 International Labour Organization, supra note 5, para. 32. As of October 2005, ILO Convention No. 29 had 
168 states parties, and ILO Convention No. 105 had 165 states parties. A list of states parties is available at 
http://www. i I o. org/i I ol ex/en gl ish/ newratf rarneE. htm . 
99 SeeS. Cleveland, 'Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act', ("1998) 76 Texas Law Review 1533, 
at 1571 ('The prohibition of forced labor and slave-like practices are now widely recognised in conjunction 
with slavery as customary international norms'). See also jennings and Watts, supra note 97, at 982; L. 
Henkin, 'Human Rights and State "Sovereignty"', (1995-1996) 25 Georgia journal of International and 
Comparative Law 31, at 37. 
100 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Ci1·. 2002) ('forced labor is so widely condemned 
that it has achieved the status of a jus cogens violation'}; Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed 
Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine the Observance 
by Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29}, 2 july 1998, para. 203, available at http:// 
www.ilo.org/public/engiish/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm ('there exists now in international 
law a peremptory norm prohibiting any recourse to fmced labour'). 
'
01 See, e.g., ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 66, Art. 25 (requiring states to make forced labour 'punishable 
as a penal offense'L See also notes 111-115 and accompanying text, infra. 
'!ll Vienna Convention on the Law of Tr(~aties, supra note 95, Art. 53. 
'
03 ICCPR, supra note 75, Art. 4(2); ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 15{2); ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 27{2). See aloo 
Restatement, supra note 95, § 702 cmt. a (omiiting forced labour from a non-exhaustive list of jus cogens 
norms). 
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1.2. Slavery, the slave trade, slavery-like practices, and forced labour as 
international crimes entailing individual criminal responsibility 
1.2.1. Slavery-related activities as freestanding international crimes 
Professor Bassiouni identifies two requirements for internationally 
circumscribed conduct to rise to the level of an international crime: such conduct 
must either amount to an offence against the entire international community, or 
interstate cooperation must be necessary for the effedive suppression of the conduct, 
or both.'04 Yet beyond the four so called 'core crimes' of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, aggression, and war crimes, determining which acts constitute international 
crimes is no easy task. International conventions seldom proclaim explicitly that the 
ads they proscribe constitute international crimes, and no all-encompassing list of 
international crimes exists. Therefore, according to Bassiouni, one must look for 
certain features in an international instrument in order to discern whether its drafters 
intended to internationally criminalise the behaviour spelled out therein; the most 
typical of these features are the right or duty to make the condud a crime under 
national law, the right or duty to prosecute or extradite offenders, the right or duty to 
punish offenders, and the duty to cooperate with and render assistance to other 
states parties in the suppression of the condud. 105 The presence of one or more of 
these features in several of the anti-slavery and anti-forced-labour conventions provides 
the most solid evidence that slavery, the slave trade, slavery-like practices, and many 
forms of forced labour constitute international crimes. 
Among these four categories, the slave trade most clearly qualifies as an 
international crime. It ranks alongside piracy as one of the very first international 
crimes giving rise to universal jurisdiction,'06 and as early as 1841 the Treaty of 
London established a duty on states parties to prohibit, prevent, prosecute, and 
punish the slave trade. ' 07 The 1926 and 1956 Slavery Conventions reiterate the 
'u~ M. C. Bassiouni, 'The Penal Characteristics of International Criminal Law', (1983) 15 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International law 27, 28-29. 
1115 See M. C. Bassiouni, International Crimes: Digest!lndex of International Instruments 1815-1985 (1986), 
Vol. 1, at lv. The following is the full list of Bassiouni's ten features: (1) explicit recognition of proscribed 
conduct as constituting an international crime, or a crime under international law, or a crime; (2) implicit 
recognition of the penal nature of the act by establishing a duty to prohibit, prevont, prosecute, punish, or 
the like; (3) criminalisation of the proscribed conduct; (4) duty or right to prosecute; (5) duly or right to 
punish the proscribed conduct; (6) duty or right to extradite; (7) duty or right to cooperate in prosecution 
and punishment (including judicial assistance); (8) establishment of a criminal jurisdictional basis; 
(9) reference to the establishment of an international criminal court or international tribunal with penal 
charactei"istlcs; (10) no defence of superior orders. Ibid. 
'
06 C. de Than and E. Shorts, International Criminal law and Human Rights (2003), 264. 
'
07 1841 Treaty of london, supra note 46, Arts. I, Ill, VI-VII, X, XV. 
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obligation on states parties to criminalise the slave trade and prosecute those who 
trade in slaves, and the 1956 Convention labels such trade a 'criminal offence'. 10" 
Slavery and slavery-like practices doubtless also give rise to international 
criminal responsibility. Article 6 of the 1926 Slavery Convention obliges states 
parties to 'undertake to adopt the necessary measures in order that severe 
penalties may be imposed' for placing or maintaining someone in the condition 
of chattel slave, and Article 4 establishes a duty on states parties to grant each 
other assistance in securing the abolition of slavery. 109 The 1956 Supplementary 
Slavery Convention likewise sets forth the obligation to criminalise and 
prosecute the act of enslavement, as well as the act of placing someone into a 
'servile status' by means of debt bondage, serfdom, etc., and that of 'mutilating, 
branding or otherwise marking a slave or a person of servile status.' 110 
Like slavery, the slave trade, and slavery-like practices, the conventions 
that define forced labour also contain certain features that evince its qualification 
as a 'freestanding' crime under intemationallaw-that is, an activity recognised 
as internationally criminal even where it is not a predicate offence to one of 
the core crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity~but in 
less absolute terms. Article 5 of the 1926 Slavery Convention prohibits the use 
of forced labour for private purposes unambiguously; when read in conjunction 
with Article 6's duty to criminalise and prosecute infractions of the 1926 
Convention, this prohibition could be construed as making any private use of 
forced labour-regardless of the reasons for such use-internationally 
criminal."' ILO Convention No. 29 repeats the prohibition on forced labour 
for private purposes, 112 but allows it for public purposes subject to a number of 
conditions and guarantees designed to make the conditions of the forced labour 
as much like those of voluntary labour as possible, such as normal working 
'
08 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 47, Art. 3; 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 56, 
Art. 3. The 1958 Geneva Corwention on the High Seas and the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention each 
contain ~imilar provisions. See '1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 13, 450 UNTS 82, 
reprinted in (1958) 52 AjiL 842; 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 99, UN Doc. NCONF.62/ 
122 (1982), reprinted in(1982) 21 ILM 1261. 
'm 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 47, Arts. 4, 6. 
''
0 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 56, Arts. S-6. In addition, Article 8 of 1he 1956 
Convention establishes a duty or· right of states parties to cooperate with each other and with the United 
Nations in the prosecution and punishment of slavery, the slave trade, and slavery-like practices. Ibid., Art. 
8. Slavery has even been put forth as an act which could give rise to state criminalr·esponsibility, constituting 
along with genocide and apartheid 'a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance 
for safeguarding the human being.' See Draft Articles on State Responsibility Adopted So Far by the 
International Law Commission, Art. 19(3)(c), reproduced in j. H. 1·"1. Weiler et al. (eds.), International 
Crimes of State (1989), 360. 
11
' 1926 Slavery Convention, supra no!e 47, Arts. 5-6. 
112 ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 66, Arts. 1(2), 4(1). 
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hours, safe conditions, and remuneration at the same rate as free labour. 
Moreover, the work must be necessary, in the direct interest of the community, 
and must not place too heavy a burden on the population.m Recall as well 
that Article 2 of Convention No. 29 completely exempts from the scope of 
'forced or compulsory labour' several practices, such as military and community 
service and hard prison time. 114 As a result of these exceptions and exemptions, 
Article 25's duty to criminalise, prosecute, and punish extends only to 'the 
illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour'. 115 
Presumably, then, only 'illegal' forms of forced labour rise to the level 
of international crimes, including forced labour exacted by private individuals 
and any other recourse to forced labour in violation of the detailed conditions 
and guarantees laid out in Convention No. 29, but not including exempted 
conduct such as compulsory military service. Thus, the 1926 Slavery Convention 
and Conventions No. 29 and 105 appear to establish a continuum whereby 
the further the conditions of the forced labour are from those of free labour, 
the more likely such labour constitutes a violation of international law and, in 
the extreme, an international crime. Three factors stand out as most directly 
contributing to the conversion of permissible forced labour into criminal forced 
labour: its non public nature, more total control over the worker's life, and the 
inhumanity of the conditions to which the worker is subjected.'" Many 
commentators' accounts of typical Amazonian forced-labour conditions would 
seem to place it in this category."' 
1.2.2. Slavery-related activities as crimes against humanity 
An act deemed 'enslavement' has appeared as a predicate offence of 
crimes against humanity in every international instrument listing such crimes 
since Article 6(c) of the 1945 Nuremberg Charter. 118 The Nuremberg Tribunal 
lH Ibid., Ar1s. 11-19. See also Bassiouni 1991, supra note 43, at 470-471. 
ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 66, Art. 2(2)(a) .. ·(e). 
"' Ibid., Art. 25 (emphasis addt'd). 
1
"; SeeS. R. Ratner and]. S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Abuses in International law: Beyond 
the Nuremberg legacy (2001}, 115. See also Bassiouni 1991, supra note 43, at 456,459, 471; Rassam, 
supra note 24, at 341-342. 
111 Se<e, e.g., Bales, supra note 7, at 130-131; Sutton, supra nott" 8, at 118. 
1;n See, l'.g., Nuremberg Charter, supra note 41, Art. 6(c); Tokyo Charter, supra note 42, Art. S(c); Control 
Council Law No. 10, Art. 11(1)(c), in Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany (1946), Vol. 3, at 
50; Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and SPcurity of Mankind (1954), Art. 2(11), reprinted in(1954) 
2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 151, UN Doc. A/2693 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 Draft 
Code]; Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991), Art. 21, in RepOI"t of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty third Session, UN Doc. N46/1 0 (1991} [hereinafter 
1991 Draft Code]; D1-aft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), Art. 18(d), in 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty eighth Session, UN Doc. A/51/10 
(1996) [hereinafter 1996 Draft Code]; ICTY Statute, supra note 29, Art. 5(c}; ICTR Statute, supra note 30, 
Art. 3(cli Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art. 7(1)(c). 
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convicted Nazi commanders Fritz Sauckel and Baldur von Schirach of violating 
Article 6(c) for their roles in securing the forcible transfer into Germany of 
some five million foreigners-in the words of the Tribunal, 'under terrible 
conditions of cruelty and suffering'-to help relieve the wartime labour 
shortage. 119 Although the judgment alternatively deems the brutal working 
conditions to which the victims were subjected 'slave labour' and 'forced 
labour', it does not provide a legal definition for these concepts. 120 
Both the 1954 and 1996 ILC Draft Codes of Crimes Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind list 'enslavement' as a predicate offence of crimes 
against humanity, but neither Code sets forth a definition of which acts constitute 
enslavement.' 21 The Commentary to the 1996 Draft Code, however, does 
provide an enlightening clarification: 'Enslavement means establishing or 
maintaining over persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour contrary 
to well-established and widely recognised standards of international law.' 122 
The inclusion of servitude and forced labour comports with the enslavement 
formulation in the crimes-against-humanity analogue of the 1991 Draft Code. 
Article 21 of the 1991 Draft Code lists as a proscribed systematic or mass 
violation of human rights 'establishing or maintaining over persons a status of 
slavery, servitude or forced labour.'' 23 
The 1998 Rome Statute likewise incorporates a definition of 
'enslavement' for purposes of crimes against humanity. Article 7(2)(c) seems at 
first glace to define that term in the same narrow fashion as the 1926 Slavery 
Convention: 'the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person'. 124 The Article proceeds, however, to include in the 
definition of enslavement 'the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking 
in persons, in particular women and children', and the formulation in the 
Elements of Crimes expands the definition even further: 
The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership over a person, such as by purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such person or persons, or by imposing on 
119 See GOring et aL, International Military Tribunal, judgment and Sentence, 1 October 1946, in Trial of the 
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 
1946 (1947), Vol. 22, at 565-568. 
110 See ibid. 
w 1954 Draft Code, supra note 118, Art. 2(11 ); 1996 Draft Code, supra note 118, Art. 18(d). 
122 Report of the International law Commission on the Work of Its Forty eighth Session, supra note 118, at 98. 
113 1991 Draft Code, supra note 118, Art. 21. Recall that 'servitude' presumably includes the slavery~like 
practices of the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention. See note 80 and accompanying text, supra. 
'
24 Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art. 7(2)(c). This part of the Rome Statute definition is a verbatim copy of the 
definition of slave1y in the 1926 Slavery Convention. See 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 47, Art. 1(1 ). 
334 
them a similar deprivation of liberty .... It is understood that such 
deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting 
forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as 
defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in 
this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women 
and children. 125 
It would appear, then, that the scope of enslavement as a crime against 
humanity in the Rome Statute is broad indeed, including not only chattel slavery, 
but also trafficking in persons, the slavery-like practices of the 1956 
Supplementary Slavery Convention (debt bondage, serfdom, etc.), and forced 
labour, presumably as defined in ILO Conventions No. 29 and 105.126 
The following section of this article places the discussion of slavery and 
related activities into concrete context by evaluating Brazil's largely failed 
attempts at curbing the use of forced labour in the Amazon. Section 3 follows 
with an examination of whether such failure can give rise to state responsibility 
under the rather extensive regime of international obligations outlined above, 
and concludes with an examination of whether the individual perpetrators 
could be held criminally responsible under international law for placing persons 
in situations of forced labour, either for the commission of a freestanding 
international crime or a crime against humanity. 
2. The modest achievements of Brazil's anti-forced-labour 
campaign 
2.1. Brazilian government action against forced labour 
As a result of an international shaming campaign orchestrated by the 
Pastoral Land Cornrnission (CPT) in conjunction with several international NGO 
allies, 127 the Brazilian government had no choice by 1993 but to openly 
'
2
:; ICC Elements of Crimes, Art. 7(1){c), element 1 and n.11, reprinted in W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to 
the International Criminal Court (2004), 279, 284. 
126 The Rome Statute is also unique in specifically enumerating two other contemporary manifestations of 
slavery as crimes against humanity: sexual slavery and forced prostitution. See Rome Statute, supra note 
31, Art. 7(1)(g). 
m The CPT's main international NGO allies have been Anti-Slavery International, which has sponsored annual 
trips by CPT leaders to testify before UN and European Union bodies, and the Center for Justice and 
International Law and Human Rights Watch, which have lent their financial support and legal expertise to 
the CPT in taking several emblematic cases of labour exploitation before the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights. See j. Cavallaro, 'Toward Fair Play: A Decade of Transformation and Resistance in 
International Human Rights Advocacy in Brazil', (2002) 3 Chicago Journal of International law 481, at 
484. See also text accompanying notes 177-183, 226-237, infra. 
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acknowledge the continued existence of forced labour in its territory. 128 Policy 
change came two years later with the presidential inauguration of Fernando 
Hen rique Cardoso, 129 who in June 1995 announced a series of pioneering anti-
forced-labour initiatives ostensibly designed to eliminate the practice by 2003. 130 
Despite some positive precedents, however, the Cardoso campaign failed to 
diminish the occurrence of forced labour, and when Luiz lnacio Lui ada Silva 
succeeded to the presidency in january 2003, he immediately took on forced 
labour as one of his administration's top priorities.131 In March 2003 Lui a promulgated 
an ambitious National Plan for the Eradication of Slave Labourm designed to go far 
beyond Cardoso's efforts, setting 2006 as the target date for full eradication.133 
Both administrations' plans have envisioned a multifaceted offensive 
against fazendeiros who make use of forced labour, including rigorous 
inspections of fazendas; tough criminal sanctions for subjecting workers to 
slavery-like conditions; high administrative fines and moral-damages judgments 
against labour-law violators; and other economic deterrents such as 
expropriation and suspension of development financing. The discussion that 
follows examines the major successes and failures of the two plans in tandem, 
as well as some of the reasons behind the failures. 
2.1.1. Federal labour inspections and freeing of workers 
The centrepiece of both presidents' reforms has been the creation and 
strengthening of the Mobile Group of Labour Inspection (Grupo Especial de 
Fiscaliza~ao M6vel), a centralised inspection agency within the Ministry of 
Labour. 1 l4 The Group, which has grown steadily in size and importance since 
1995, consists of teams of labour inspectors that monitor fazendas nationwide 
uo Sutton, supra note 8, at 145. The acknowledgement was made by former Labour Minister Walter Bare IIi at 
the annual ILO labour conler;:-nce in Geneva. See ibid. 
''
9 Cardoso wrote his doctoral dissertation on the damaging social legacy of slavery in Brazil, subsequently 
published as F. H. Cardoso, Capitalismo e escravidao no Brasil meridional: 0 negro na sociedade 
escravocrata do Rio Grande do Sui (1962, 2d (~d. 1977). 
ua Pmsident Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Radio Address on Forced Labour (27 june 1995), in Ministec~·io do 
Trabalho e Emprego (ed.), A experiCncia do Grupo Especial de Fiscaliza~ao M6vel 2002 (2002), 3 at 3. 
Cardoso ultimately consolidated these measures in 1996 under the National Program of Human Rights, 
which was revamped in 2002. Ten of the 2002 Program's 518 human righ\s proposals dealt with forced 
labour. See Minist€rio da justir,.:a, Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos II (2002}, proposals 396-405. 
IJl In a speech at the ceremony launching the Plan, President Lula professed his administration's resolve: 
'[M]uch more than simply crea1ing a law, we are transforming into the will of the state the eradication of 
slave labour in our country.' President Luiz ln<icio Lula da Silva, Address at the Launching of the National 
Plan fm the Eradication of Slave Labour (11 March 2003) (author's translation) (transcript on file with 
author). 
'
32 Th(e Plan outlines 75 specific anti-forced-labour proposals. See generally Presidf~ncia da RepUblica do Bra5i\, 
Plano Nadonal para a Erradica~ao do Trabalho Escravo (2003). 
133 
'Nilmiirio Miranda lan~a campanha no audit6rio do Banco da Amaz6nia', Liberal (Bel6m), 26 November 
2003. 
>.'.4 The Mobile Group was created by Portarias MTE no. 549 and 550 of 14 june 199.5. 
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and raid-under the protection of Federal Police agents-any fazenda suspected 
of employing forced labour. If the Group finds forced labour, it confiscates 
weapons and directs the police to arrest gun wielding foremen, empreiteiros, 
gatos, and any other management-level personnel responsible for creating or 
perpetuating the forced-labour situation. It frees the workers and makes 
arrangements to return them to their places of origin. The Labour Ministry then 
puts pressure on the fazendeiro to pay the workers their back wages, under 
threat of legal action, and the fazendeiro remains subject to additional sanctions 
under federal labour and criminal legislation. 135 
The Mobile Group has freed forced labourers each year and has often 
managed to secure from the gatos and empreiteiros the payment of the workers' 
back wages. Nonetheless, although the number of freed peoes increased 
significantly from 1995 (84) to 2003 (4,932, more than twice the 2002 figure 
and 85 percent of all workers liberated in all the previous years of the Group's 
existence combined')('), the number decreased to 2,887 in 2004.m For the 
first eight months of 2005 the number stood at just 3,025, despite the CPT's 
formal denunciation during the same period of 171 cases of forced labour 
involving some 5,500 workers.' 38 A 2004 ILO report attributed the diminution 
in part to a continued paucity of resources: while the Lula administration 
increased from four to six the number of inspection teams (amounting to an 
additional 150 labour inspectors) and provided more equipment to the Mobile 
Group (for example, 16 new four wheel drive vehicles), the Group's human 
and financial resources are still inadequate to effectively inspect many of the 
alleged forced-labour situations on hundreds of fazendas across the vast, remote, 
and inhospitable southern Amazon."' Indeed, one labour inspector estimated 
in 2004 that the Group still reaches less than one third of the total of forced 
labourers in the country. 140 
'"'' Minist(~rio da justi\=a and Minist<'rio do Trabalho e Emprego, 0 combate ao trabalho for~ado no Brasil 
(2002), 1"1. 
116 H. Gomes Batista, 'Nlimerodepessoas libe1tadasdetrabalhoescravodobraem 2003', Valor EconOmico, 17 December 
2003. 
137 j. 1\ndrade, '11..0 Praises the Way Brazil Is Deaiingwith Slave labor',Agfncia Brasil (Brasilia), 12 May 2005. 
13e R. Brasiliense, 'Mato Grosso lidera trabalhoescravo', liberal (Bel<'m), 17September 2005. 
; 19 ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Individual Observation 
Concerning Convention No. 29, Forced Labour, 1930 -·Brazil (2005) [hereinafter CEACR Report], available 
at htlp://www.ilo.org/ilolex/gbe/ceacr2003.htm. As recently as 30 March 2005, the interminist·erial 
commission in charge of the Mobile Group sent a letter to PresidPnt lui a complaining that the per diems 
allocated to inspectors and their Fedeml Police protectors of 60 rea is (about €20), were insufficient to cover 
food and lodging expenses during inspection trips. See Letter from National Commission for the Eradication 
of Slave labour (CONATRAE) to President Luiz lnficio lui ada Silva (30 March 2005) (on file with author). 
'"
0 A.M. Dias, 'A casa-grandeataca', Carta Capila\,4 Februa1y 2004,34, 36. 
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Table: Number of labourers Freed by the Mobile Group of labour 
Inspection from January 1995 through August 2005 
Year Number of labourers freed 
1995 ........................................ 84 
1996 ....................................... 425 
1997 ....................................... 394 
1998 ....................................... 159 
1999 ....................................... 725 
2000 ....................................... 527 
2001 .................................... 1,174 
2002 ···································· 2,306 
2003 ................................ 4, 932 141 
2004 ................................ 2,887142 
2005 (through August) .......... 3,025 143 
Total .................................. 16,638 
Brazilian Labour Ministry estimates put the total of freed workers from 
the beginning of the Mobile Group's existence in 1995 through August 2005 
at approximately 16,600 (see Table, supra). Yet notwithstanding this seemingly 
laudable figure in relation to the estimated total of between 25,000 and 100,000 
forced labourers in the country,' 44 most workers freed by the Mobile Group 
(an estimated 40 percent145 ) inevitably fall back into coercive labour 
relationships. The same fate befalls those discharged by the gato-with their 
debts 'forgiven' -when he no longer needs their services. Freed and discharged 
workers find their way back to small towns in the region and quickly spend 
what little money they have on lodging and sustenance; with insufficient 
resources to finance the trip home to Piauf or Maranhao and lacking other 
opportunities for employment, most pe6es have little choice but to sign up 
with the next gato who passes through town. 146 As the CPT's Ricardo Rezende 
explains, '[the pe6es') thinking is that "If I am hungry enough, I will run the risk 
and hope that this contractor is better than the other ones, because it's better to 
take that chance than let my family die of hunger."' 147 Even more troublesome 
is the not uncommon posture of one worker critical of his liberation by the 
"
11 International Labour Organization, supra note 20, at 23 (figures from 1995 to 2003). 
'
41 Andrade, supra note 137. 
141 Brasifiense, supra note 138. 
; 44 See notes 18-20 and accompanying text, supra. 
w; CEACR Report, supra note 139. 
146 Freed pe6es seldom make it back to their states of origin, and end up permanently in the southern Amazon, 
moving from fazenda to fazenda as job opportunities present themsdves. This fact pctrtially explains the 
high percentage of forced labourers recruited from towns in Par<'i (16%) vis a vis towns in Piauf (22%) and 
Maranhao (39%). 'Escravos do seculo 21: 0 mapa da escravid<'io', 0 Dia Online, 16 November 2003. 
111 L. Rohter, 'Brazil's Prized Exports Rely on Slaves and Scorched Land', N.Y. Times, 25 March 2002, A1 
{translation in original). 
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Mobile Group: 'If it wasn't for [the fazendeiros and the gatos], we'd all be on 
the street eating rubbish.'' 48 The Group's limited reach, the high rate of 
recurrence, and the attitude of many of those freed suggest that simply liberating 
workers has done and will continue to do little to diminish the level of forced 
labour in the country. 149 
2.1.2. Prosecutions and revamping of pertinent Penal Code provisions 
With more than 16,600 instances of forced labour discovered by the 
Mobile Group to date, one would expect to see many fazendeiros thrown in 
jail for having authorised or tolerated the use afforced labour on their holdings. 
But in spite of both administrations' repeated mentions of the need to impose 
serious criminal sanctions on fazendeiros to deter them from employing forced 
labour, only three fazendeiros were convicted of forced-labour crimes during 
the Cardoso period, one of these convictions was overturned on appeal, and 
no fazendeiro has been convicted under Lula's watch. Following raids on their 
respective Amazonian holdings, fazendeiros Silvio Caetano de Almeida and 
Antonio Barbosa de Melo were convicted by federal judges of violating Article 
149 of the Penal Code (reduction of another to a condition analogous to slavery), 
and sentenced to four and two years in jail, respectively;' 50 a federal judge 
convicted a third fazendeiro, Luiz Carlos Dal Bosco, of violating Article 149 in 
respect of the workers on his fazenda in the southern state of Santa Catarina.'"' 
None of the three men has spent a single day behind bars. The judge in Barbosa 
de Melo's case converted his sentence into the distribution of 30 food baskets 
to the needy. 152 Caetano appealed his sentence-which the trial judge had 
converted into probation-and the Federal Regional Tribunal (Tribunal Regional 
Federai-TRF) for the First Region overturned the conviction. "'3 Dal Bosco, 
whose sentence the trial judge had commuted to community service and 
pecuniary damages, appealed as well, and the TRF for the Fourth Region upheld 
1
·
18 A. Foster, 'Slave-Like Conditions Deep in the Amazon Reflect Brazil's Failure to Combat Poverty', Financial 
Post, 5 June 1996, 58 (translation in original). 
'"
9 A go~neral sentiment of invincibility prevails among fazendeiros, evidenced by the significant rate of re 
raiding of the same fazendas: of the 117 Para fazendas raided by the Mobile Group in 2002, at least 27 
were subsequently re raided, and some fazendas have been re raided more than fivt~ times. H. des Roziers, 
Address at the Third Annual World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, Brazil (26 janua1y 2003) (transcript on file 
with author). 
"
0 LeBreton, supra note 3, at 157 n.4, 232. 
151 See TRF 4a Regiiio, Apelay<'io Criminal no. 2001.04.01.045970-8, juiz Relator FJbio Rosa (2002) (appeals 
court upholding trial court conviction) [hereinafter Dal Bosco Appeal]. 
152 l..e Breton, supra note 3, at 157 n.4, 232. 
,, TRF 1 a Regiao, Apela~:ao Criminal no. 1998.01.00.064116-1, Juiz Relator Luciano Tolentino Amaral (1998) 
[hereinafter Caetano Appeal]. 
339 
his conviction. 154 Former Chief Federal Labour judge Francisco Fausto has 
likened these punishments to a slap on the wrist for wealthy fazendeiros. 155 
A combination of factors-including jurisdictional disputes between 
federal and state judiciaries, the recalcitrance and inefficiency of both judiciaries, 
and pressures on judges, police, and labour inspectors from local powers-has 
hampered efforts to prosecute more fazendeiros. In fact, only a handful of 
gatos and small landowners have actually served real jail time for forced-labour 
crimes, and even these convicts seldom serve out the duration of their 
sentences. 15'' As explained in a 2001 ILO publication, '[t]he impunity enjoyed 
by those responsible, the slowness of judicial processes, and the lack of 
coordination among the governmental bodies end up protecting those 
responsible for exacting forced labour in Brazil and elsewhere.' 157 
The criminal-law aspects of the fight against forced labour have enjoyed 
limited success in the legislative realm, however, with the December 2003 
passage of a bill strengthening Penal Code Article 149 in several ways. 158 First, 
it developed the enigmatic concept of a 'condition analogous to slavery' to 
include the forced submission of workers to an exhaustive work schedule or to 
degrading work conditions through the restriction of the workers' freedom of 
movement by whatever means, including through the imposition of a debt. 
Secondly, the amended provision criminalised several non physical coercive 
means of forcing a worker not to leave the locale, including patrolling by armed 
guards and the retention of documents or personal objects. Thirdly, the 
amendment provided for the imposition of a fine in addition to imprisonment, 
and it incorporated a one half increase in the punishment if the victim is a 
minor or the crime is committed on discriminatory grounds. 159 
''' Dal Bosco Appeal, supra note 151. This 'split in the circuits' has to do with the~ respective competence of 
the federal and state judiciari(~5 under the federal Constitution to hear criminal cases charging a violation of 
Article 149. See otes 201-205 and accompanying text, infl"a. 
155 
'Fausto: s(J confisco de terra acabard com trabalho escravo', Notkias do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, 29 
August 2003. 
'
56 International Labour Orgcmization, supra note 5, para. 81. For example, a judge ordered the early release of 
one particularly notorious gato, the 70-year-old AntOnio Avelino, because of his advanu~d age. LeBreton, 
supra note 3, at 123,179,232. 
i 57 International Labour Organization, supra note 5, }Jill-a. 81. 
156 See 'Fausto destaca projetos contra trabalhos escravo e infantil, NoHdas do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, 
20 November 2003. 
'
14 See Braz. C(Jdigo Penal, A1t. 197. A second bill, passed by Congress in 1998 as Lei no. 9.777, amended 
A1ticles 203 and 207 of the Penal Code by criminal ising such practices as luring workers from one state to 
another under false pretences, retaining documents in order to force someone to work, and obliging someone 
to buy mercha11dise from the fazenda store in order to build up a debt. See Braz. C6digo Penal, Arts. 203, 
207. 
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Nevertheless, the amendment as passed seems to have failed to satisfy 
the additional goals of anti-forced-labour advocates. A fourth proposed change 
would have increased Article 149's minimum sentencing threshold from two 
to four years; such an increase would have had a significant impact because, 
under Brazilian criminal law, a four-year minimum precludes the sentencing 
judge from suspending the sentence and substituting less harsh punishments, 
such as the donation of food baskets to the poor, probation, and community 
service (as has occurred in all three convictions under Article 149 to date). 160 
Yet while the Senate finally approved the bill with the higher sentencing 
threshold in 2002, it took another year for the Chamber of Deputies to follow 
suit by passing a diluted version that left the minimum sentence at two years. 161 
With President Lula's signature, this version of the bill became enshrined in 
Article 149, thus effectively ending the debate over the minimum sentencing 
threshold.lf'2 Indeed, the failure of the Chamber to sanction the Senate's raising 
of the minimum threshold seems to have removed many of the teeth that the 
reformed law would have had. 
2.1.3. Administrative sanctions for labour-law violations 
Former Chief Federal Labour judge Fausto's harsh criticisms of the virtual 
inaction of his counterparts in the ordinary federal and state judiciaries 
(responsible for adjudicating crimes, as opposed to violations of the labour 
code) reflect a very different and less tolerant attitude on the part of many in 
the Brazilian labour judiciary and the federal Labour Public Ministry (Ministerio 
Publico do Trabalho). The Ministry has brought a great number of administrative 
proceedings against alleged forced-labour fazendas (more than 600 as of May 
2005 161 )-, including several owned by high-profile state and federal politicians, 
and regional labour courts have found many of these fazendeiros responsible 
for labour-law violations, often ordering the payment of moral damages in 
addition to wage arrears. 
Perhaps the two biggest fish found responsible thus far have been federal 
deputy Inocencio de Oliveira-made to pay 530,000 reais for maintaining 53 
workers in slavery-like conditions on his Maranhao fazenda-and federal senator 
joao Ribeiro, whose damages amounted to 760,000 reais for 38 workers on 
his Para fazenda. 164 Ribeiro's judgment was the second largest ever awarded in 
a forced-labour case. '65 Federal labour judge jorge Vieira, who was forced to 
1611 G. Doca, 'Lei que pune trabalho escravo sera mais dura', G!obo (Rio de Janeiro), 30 October 2003. 
101 Di<lrio do Senado Federal, 25 November 2003, available at http://www.senado.gov.br. 
1(,, 'Trabalho escravo: Fausto elogia alterao;Jo no C6digo Penal', Noticias do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, 
15 December 2003. 
161 International Labour Organization, supra note 20, para. 91. 
'
6
"
1 L. Sakamo1o, 'Senador condenado por trabalho escravo', Carta Maior, 23 February 2005. 
'
1
'
1 Ibid. 
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abandon his Para labour court during several months of 2003 and 2004 after 
receiving death threats, '66 has been the most active in holding forced-labour 
fazendeiros responsible,'" overseeing the largest settlement (1.35 million reais 
in August 2004) and imposing the first (in 2002) and largest (3 million reais in 
May 2005) damages awards in relation to forced labour. 168 
2.1.4. Other measures 
In 1995 federal deputies introduced a proposed amendment to Article 
243 of the federal Constitution to allow for the uncompensated expropriation 
of forced-labour fazendas; the expropriated lands would be consigned to the 
agrarian reform and reserved for the persons who had been forced to work on 
them. '69 Former Chief Labour Judge Fausto and former Human Rights Secretary 
Nil mario Miranda have argued vehemently in favour of the proposal, known 
as Proposta de Emenda Constitucional (PEC) no. 438/01 in its current form, 
stressing that the only truly c•ffective way to counterbalance the economic 
incentive to use forced labour is with an even greater economic disincentive. 170 
Nonetheless, despite a decade on the table, passage by the Senate in 
2002, and reiterated calls-including from President Lula himself-for the 
proposal's passage in the wake of the massacre ofthree Mobile Group inspectors 
in january 2004,' 71 as of September 2005 PEC no. 438/01 still languished before 
the Chamber of Deputies, m where resistance from a small but powerful band 
of deputies from within the fazendeiro sphere of influence has managed to 
keep the proposal from even coming to a vote. 173 Prospects for the proposal's 
166 
'Fausto cobra protec;ao d<1 Polfcia Federal a juiz ameac;ado no Para', Noticias do Tribunal Superior do 
Trabalho, 1 October 2003. 
1
"
7 Des Roziers, supra note 149. 
1011 L. Sakamoto, 'No dia da aboli\=do, sai maior condena(Jo por trabaiho escravo no pais', Carta Maior, 13 
May 2005. The Lula administration can claim additional success in the November 2003 promulgation of a 
so-called 'dirty list' of persons and companies which c:xploit forced labour. The Labour Ministry forwards 
the list-which in September 2005 contained 188 names-every six months to state financial institutions, 
urging them to suspend the impugned entities' credit and development financing. See Portaria no. 1.150 de 
18 d(~ novembro de 2003 (do Ministerio de Estado da lntt:.>gra~ao Nacional). See also 'OIT, Ethos e Rep611er 
Brasil lan(_;:am sistema de busca da lista suja-agfncia', Carta Maior, 12 September 2005. 
169 L. Sakamoto, 'Ainda ha fazendas que 'contratam' pessoas sem nenhum direito', in Ministerio do Trabalho 
e Emprego, supra note 130, at 84, 89. Article 243 of the Constitution currently includes only fazendas on 
which psychotropic plants are found. See Braz. Constitution, Art. 243. 
170 D. Weber, 'OIT elogia Brasil no combate ao trabalho escravo', Globo (Rio de janeiro), 12 May 2005. See 
also R. Gomide, 'Relat6rio cornplica Picciani', Oia (Rio de janeiro), 22 july 2003. Indeed, the loss of a 
fazenda would likdy bring much graver economic consequences than even a civil-damages judgment 
rendered by Judge Vieirai for example, the Lima AraUjo fazendas, for which Vieira recently imposed the 
record-high judgment of 3 million reais, have a combined value of more than 212 million rea is. Sakamoto, 
supra note 168. 
171 I. B1·aga, 'Lula decide apressar projeto contra escravidao', Globo (Rio de janeiro), 11 Febmary 2004. 
m Brasiliense, supra note 138. 
1n P. Audi, 'Trabalho escravo: avan~os e desafios', Correio Braziliense (Brasilia), ·19 May 2005. 
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passage in the near future look grim, moreover, with influential congressmen 
such as former Chamber President Severino Cavalcanti promising to 'throw 
[the proposal] in the trash.'' 74 This opposition group, which has also been 
responsible for eviscerating Penal Code Article 149175 and perpetuating 
legislative logjams in respect of other proposed anti-forced-labour laws, claims 
that uncompensated expropriation would jeopardise private property rights, 
free initiative, and free competition. 176 
Potentially even more troublesome than these enduring obstacles, 
however, is the current administration's refusal to aq:ept responsibility for failing 
to prevent human rights abuses committed in Brazi,l, notwithstanding repeated 
proclamations to the contrary, One final legislative enactment that deserves 
mention is the law conceding 52,000 reais to Jose Pereira177-a rural worker 
whom fazenda thugs shot and seriously injured in 1989 after he tried to escape 
from a forced-labour fazenda-pursuant to a settlement reached with the CPT 
and its international NCO allies and approved by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, " 8 ln spite of former Human Rights Secretary Miranda's 
public boasts that the Pereira settlement symbolises the government's reconciliatory 
attitude, the wording of the law as passed refleds a rather different position.' 79 While 
the bill contains the language 'arising out of the responsibility assumed by the Union 
under international human rights treaties',' 80 no such language appears in the law as 
passed, which contains the following disclaimer: 'The payment of damages , , , exempts 
the Union from providing any other compensation to the beneliciary.'181 
Moreover, in this instance the bill's watering down came not as a result of 
opposition from fazendeiro allies in Congress, but at the Lula administration's 
own prompting, In a brief to Congress opposing the bill's absoluteness, executive-
branch lawyers argued that, since Brazil did not adhere to the American 
Convention on Human Rights until 1992 and did not submit to the jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Court until 1998,182 the Court lacked the competence to 
11
' R. Boechat, 'Ja era: PEC contra o trabalho escravo "no lixo'", Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), 22 February 2005 (author's 
translation). 
'
70 See text accompanying notes 160--162, supra. 
Gomide, supra note 21. 
'
71 Lei no. 10.706 de 30 de julhode 2003. 
178 
'Governo indeniza vitima de trabalho escravo' Folha de Sao Paulo, 19 September 2003. The Inter-American Commission's 
opinion in the case of Pereira v. B1·azil is discussed in Section 3.1, infra. See text accompanying notes 227-237. 
179 Note also that 52,000 reais~the quantity Pereira received from the Brazilian government some 14 years after his having 
been shot through the hand and head by fazenda gunmen-equals about €17,000. 
1w Min uta de Projeto de Lei concedendo indenizao;ao a jose Pereira (February 2003) (author's translation) (on file with 
author), 
'
81 Lei no. 10.706, supra note 178, Art. ·1, paragrafo tinico (authm's translation). 
'u' See Decreta Legislativo no. 89 de 3 de dezembro de 1998 (Brazil recognises the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Co Lilt 
of Human Rights); see also Decreto no. 678 de 6 de novembm de 1992 (Brazil adheres to the American Convention on 
Human Rights). 
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hear a case arising out of a 1989 incident They claimed additionally that Brazil's 
agreement to compensate Pereira would not set a precedent, that state authorities 
had indeed taken reasonable measures to investigate the incident and prosecute 
those responsible, and that the settlement would not establish the state's liability 
for this or any other human rights abuse committed by private individuals. 183 
The administration's hesitant reaction to recent demands for reparations 
for military-regime atrocities similarly evinces an aversion to full assumption 
of responsibility184 
2.2. Some reasons behind the government's lacklustre accomplishments 
Brazil's size makes it extremely difficult for the central state to deal 
effectively with the country's multiplicity of problems, particularly in the seemingly 
limitless expanses of the infrastructure poor and sparsely populated Amazon. In 
the north of the country, fazendeiro families bring in the majority of the region's 
income and wield a great deal of influence through close financial, personal, 
and even family connections with the political class. 185 Such ties have contributed 
significantly to local authorities' unwillingness to cooperate with federal labour 
inspectors and other 'meddling' officials from Brasilia' 86 
Where fazendeiros cannot fill government positions with those under 
their direct control, they buy off public agents to secure universal complicity."' 
State police, prosecutors, and judges-often along with their federal 
counterparts-tend to exhibit strong loyalty to local power elites. In the words 
of Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Human Rights Secretary under President Cardoso, 
'[p]olice and other institutions of the criminal justice system tend to act as 
border guards protecting the elites from the poor. Throughout the country, 
impunity is virtually assured for those who commit offences against victims 
considered "undesirable" or "subhuman".' 188 The poorly paid state police 
manifest the most overt allegiance to the fazendeiros and generally see no 
183 D. C. Figueira (Advogada da Uni3o), Nota SAJ no. 219/03- DCF (25 February 2003), a! 3 (on file with 
author). 
184 See L. Rohter, 'Long After Guerrilla War, Survivors Demand justice from Brazil's Government', N.Y. Times, 
28 March 2004, A8. The administ1·ation's july 2005 downgrading of the national Human Rights Secretari;-1t 
from a cabinet-level ministry to a sub secretariat subordin<lted to the Ministry of justice has additionaily 
given rise to sharp criticism from those who accuse President Lui a of having abandoned his human rights 
agenda. See B. Barbosa, 'Entidades protestam contra rnudan<;:a de status de Secretaria', Carta Maior, 15 
july 2005. 
185 S. P. Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case oi Brazil 
(1999), 335. 
w6 Human Rights Watch, supra note 5, at 7. 
1S7 LeBreton, supr-a note 3, at 227. 
'M' P. S. Pinheim, 'Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of law', Daedalus, Spring 2000, 1"19, 
at 126. 
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need to intervene in the local labour landscape, except to apprehend fugitive 
pei5es and return thern to the fazenda from which they escaped. 189 
Fazendeiros use a combination of assassination and threats of 
assassination to incapacitate all remaining poles of potential resistance. Southern 
Para has a national reputation for violence; death threats of judges such as 
jorge Vieira190 and murders of lawyers, priests, union leaders, and human rights 
activists occur with alarming frequency. 191 Fazendeiros and their loyalists have 
also set their sights on members of the Mobile Group: in january 2004, three 
federal labour inspectors and their driver were gunned down while on a rnission 
to inspect fazendas near the city of Unaf in north-western Minas Gerais. 192 
Former Unaf mayor Norberta Manica, Brazil's largest bean grower whose 
fazendas had been the target of Mobile Group raids, was indicted in relation to 
the massacre after the captured gunmen confessed that he had paid them 
US$17,000 to kill the inspectors-"3 Brazil's highest court, the Suprerne Federal 
Tribunal (Supremo Tribunal Federal), provisionally released Manica on 31 
August 2005 pending the cornrnencement of proceedings against him. 194 
Fearful that fazendeiro influence taints the professionalism of the state 
judiciary in cases implicating local fazendas, anti-forced-labour campaigners 
have repeatedly emphasised the desirability-and indeed the obligation-of 
federal adjudication of forced-labour cases. Article 109 of the Brazilian 
Constitution gives the federal judiciary competence to adjudge 'crimes against 
the organisation of labour'. 19 '1 Articles 197, 203, and 207-three of the four 
rnain Penal Code provisions pertaining to forced labour'9f'-are in the section 
of the Penal Code (which predates the Constitution by nearly five decades) 
entitled 'Of Crimes Against the Organisation of Labour'. And while Article 149 
(proscribing subjecting sorneone to slavery-like conditions) is in another section, 
several Brazilian jurists have contended that a violation of Article 149, since it 
necessarily involves labour exploitation, constitutes a crime against the 
organisation of labour. Thus, these jurists convincingly argue, all four anti-
forced-labour provisions fall squarely under federal jurisdiction. 197 
'
89 LeBreton, supra nOlfc 3, at 76. 
190 See note 166 and accompanying text, supra. 
191 R. Marques, 'f'adre Ricardo, um sobrevivente, reaparece em ato por Tim lopes', Globo, 4 August 2002. 
CPT leaders Ricardo Rezende and Hen1·i des Roziers have escaped numerous attempts on their lives, and 
CPT lawyer Paulo Fonteles was killed in 1987 after denouncing unlawful fazenda practices. le Breton, 
supra note 3, at 68. 
"'" 'Fiscais do trabaiho sao assassinados no noroeste de Minas', CBN Minas, 28 january 2004. 
'
1 \ 'Malo Grosso eo primeiro em lrabalho escravo', Folha do Estado (Cuiaba), 14 September 2005. See also 
Davidson, supra note 19. 
194 
'STF concede habeas corpus a acusado do crime de Unaf', Folha Online, 31 August 2005. 
'
95 Braz. Constitution, Art. 109, VI. 
'% The four main anti"forced-labour articles in the Penal Code are Articles 149, 197, 203, and 207. 
197 See F. D. de Castro e Costa, 0 combate ao trabalho for.;:ado no Brasil: Aspectos juridicos (2002), 9. 
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Notwithstanding Article 1 09's apparent mandate, however, federal judges 
have frequently declared themselves incompetent to hear forced-labour cases, 
and have relegated them to state courts. '98 This tendency to relegate has dealt 
a substantial blow to the anti-forced-labour campaign because, although the 
federal judiciary is slow and overworked, it is significantly more efficient and 
less corrupt than the state judiciaries. '99 Former Human Rights Secretary Pinheiro 
suggests that such relegation reflects the traditional judicial mindset: 
Access to justice in Brazil, especially for the poor, has 
always been extremely precarious. Historically, the judiciary 
has not been perceived as a body that protects the rights of the 
underprivileged classes, but rather as an institution responsible 
for the criminalization and repression of these classes. 200 
The federal judges who have relegated forced-labour cases to the state 
judiciary typically cite as authority a 1970s opinion from the extinct Federal 
Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal Federal de Recursos) which, although it classified 
'crimes against the organisation of labour' as federal offences, sanctioned the 
remittal of 'crimes against specific workers' to state judiciaries.'" The TRF for 
the First Region-whose jurisdiction covers the entire central and northern 
regions of Brazil-affirmed this position in overturning the conviction of 
fazendeiro Silvio Caetano de Almeida, holding that the federal courts lack the 
competence to hear forced-labour cases. 202 By direct contrast, the TRF for the 
Fourth Region-covering the three southernmost states of Brazil-declared the 
constitutional competence of the federal judiciary to hear cases charging a 
violation of Article 149, and correspondingly upheld the conviction of 
fazendeiro Luiz Carlos Dal Bosco.203 The federal Public Ministry has appealed 
the Caetano judgment to the Supreme Federal Tribunal. 204 The Tribunal's 
judgment, the first ever on forced labour from Brazil's highest court, was still 
pending as of mid-October 2005. 205 
193 International Labom Organization, supra note 20, para. 89. 
'
9
' Sc"e H. des Roziers, 'limites do governo brasileiro na luta contra o trabalho escravo', in Trabalho escravo 
no Brasil cont~ompordneo, supra note 1, at 209,212-213. 
200 Pinheiro, supra note 188, at 130. 
10
' St~e, e.g., Habeas Corpus no. 92.01.04616-2-PA (Parecer 511-ME) (1992); see also Decisao da Ora. Ednamar 
Silva Ramos, jufza Federal Substituta, Palmas, TO, 19 December 2001, cited in LeBreton, supra note 3, at 
232. 
101 Caetano Appeal, supra note 153. 
103 Dal Bosco Appeal, supra note 151. 
20
" Supremo Tribunal Feder·al, Recurso Extraordinar·ia no. 398041, Rc~lator Ministr·o )oaquim Barbosa (2005). 
2n5 See http://www.stf.gov.b:Jprocessos/processo.asp?PROCESSO ~ 398041 &CLASSE = RE&ORIGEM = AP&RECURSO ~ 
0& TIP jULGAMENTO=M (last visited 14 October 2005). A preliminary vote on 3 March 2005 favoured recognising 
the competence of the federal judiciary by four votes to two. See 'justic;:a Federal sai em vantagem no STF', 
available at http://www.ajufe.org.br/index.php?a ~ 04_informativo _ mostra.php&ID _MATERIA~ 1308 (Associar,:3o 
dos julzes Federais do Brasil website). 
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Finally, as suggested above in regard to the proposed constitutional 
amendment providing for uncompensated expropriation of forced-labour 
fazendas,' 06 an exceedingly large amount of national policymaking reflects the 
interests of the traditional rural power base in the north of Brazil. Many northern 
congressmen are fazendeiros themselves, and most others come from within 
the fazendeiro sphere of influence207 This fazendeiro faction, which enjoys 
substantial heft due in part to representational malapportionment in both the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, 208 has put up strong and effective 
opposition to efforts by Presidents Cardoso and Lui a to stiffen sanctions against 
rural labour exploiters. 209 
In order to combat forced labour effectively the government must, at a 
minimum, find the workers; free them; and arrest, prosecute, imprison, and 
levy fines against those responsible. It must furthermore create laws that address 
those offences typical to the forced-labour context and that target those for 
whom the anticipated deterrent effect will have the most impact. Particularly 
in the vast and sparse Amazon, these tasks require exceptional cooperation 
and zeal-or at the very least acquiescence-on the part of a multiplicity of 
government actors, including the president and his administration, federal 
legislators, the federal judiciary, labour inspectors, the police, and local officials. 
Forced labour continues to thrive in Brazil because no leader has yet been 
able to secure all the components of this manifold alliance. The following 
section of this article discusses the international legal consequences of the 
continued existence of Amazonian forced labour, both in terms of the 
responsibility of Brazil and that of the individual perpetrators of the practice. 
3. The international legal consequences of the continued existence 
of forced labour in Brazil 
3.1. The Brazilian state's responsibility for forced labour 
In international law the overwhelming majority of obligations and the 
burden of compliance with them are placed upon states, as opposed to 
individuals, corporations, international organisations, or other non state groups. 
Brazil has ratified all the anti-slavery and anti-forced-labour conventions 
100 See notes 169-176 and accompanying text, supra. 
1°7 Gomide, supra note 176. 
2011 While Brazil's three senators per state is not unlike the upper parliamenlary chambers of many countries, 
even the population-based Chamber of Deputies exhibits substantial mal apportionment. Article 45 of the 
Constitution mandates that no state should have fewer than eight or greater than 70 deputies. As a result, 
the North as a whole has nearly twice as many deputies as it would have in the absence of the 8-70 floor 
and ceiling. Braz. Constitution, Art. 45 § lo. See also R. Snyder and D. Samuels, 'Devaluing the Vote in 
Latin America', Journal of Democracy, January 2001,146, at 151. 
209 See Des Roziers, supra note 199, at 211. 
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discussed in Section 1, as well as the ICCPR and the ACH R,'10 and it thus bears 
a conventional and customary obligation not to engage in slavery, the slave 
trade, slavery-related practices, and 'illegal' forms afforced labour (for example, 
forced labour not pursuant to military service, not in response to an emergency, 
etc.). Because states are juridical abstractions which necessarily act through 
organs or agents, the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility set forth a 
number of conditions under which the actions of individuals or entities in 
violation of an international obligation binding upon a state can be attributed 
to that state. By operation of the rules of attribution, the entities that can engage 
the Brazilian state's responsibility for contravening the anti-slavery and anti-
forced-labour norms include agents of any branch of government, such as 
legislators, police officers, local mayors, and individual judges. 211 
Nevertheless, although a great number of human rights depredations 
throughout the world are committed by persons acting in a public capacity 
pursuant to government policy, slavery-related activities, like terrorism and 
hostage-taking, are most frequently carried out by private actors not acting 
under any colour of state authority and whose actions are never 
subsequently ratified by the state. 212 Such is certainly the case with 
Amazonian forced labour: the persons responsible for perpetuating these 
human rights atrocities are private landowners and their management-
level employees, and while many fazendeiros also hold government posts 
(for instance, as mayors or legislators), it would be difficult to argue that 
actions taken by such persons in a purely private capacity can potentially 
bind the Brazilian state.213 
Yet in spite of the ostensibly negative character of civil and political 
human rights norms, international tribunals, human rights bodies, and scholars 
universally recognise that in many circumstances a state has positive obligations 
to ensure that individuals within its jurisdiction do not violate rules of 
international law, including those enshrined in conventional and customary 
human rights law, and that those who do commit such violations are adequately 
punished. 
The seminal case in this regard is the Janes claim, in which the US Mexico 
General Claims Commission held the Mexican state responsible under 
210 Brazil ratified the ICCPR in january 1992 and the ACHR in july 1992. See http://www.ohchr.org/english/ 
countries/ratification/4.htrn (ICCPR ratifications); http://www.oas.org/ juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.htrnl (ACHR 
ratifications). 
m Draft Articles, sup1·a note 94, Arts. 1-2, 4. 
1
'' SeeM. C. Bassiouni, 'The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the Processes of International 
Protection of Human Rights', (1982) 9 Yale Journal of World Public Order 193, at 194 [hereinafter Bassiouni 
1982]. 
2
'
1 See Draft Articles, supra note 94, Art. 7 (even if exceeding authority or contravening instructions, a government 
agent can only bind the stale if acting in his capacity as an organ of the state). 
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international law for its failure-via the negligence and incompetence of its 
police, prosecutorial, and judicial authorities-to take adequate steps to pursue 
and punish a private citizen suspected of having murdered a US national."' In 
the same vein, the International Court of justice in the Tehran Hostages case 
held the Iranian state responsible for breaching its obligation under the Vienna 
Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and a bilateral treaty of 
amity to protect the US embassy and consulates, basing its finding in part 
on the Khomeini government's failure to take measures to control the 
militants who overran the embassy and seized its staff as hostages. 215 
Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the ECHR 
imposes a duty on states parties to prevent and punish private conduct that 
violates certain rights protected by the Convention, including the right to 
life; the Court has consistently held that the Convention's Article 1 duty to 
secure the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention imposes an 
obligation on the public authorities to take preventive operational measures 
to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another 
individual/ 16 
The landmark judgment on positive obligations in the realm of 
international human rights law came from the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in 1988. In Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, the Court held that ACHR 
Article 1 's obligation to ensure the full exercise of the Convention's rights and 
freedoms imposes on the state a duty to 'prevent, investigate and punish any 
violation recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to 
restore the rights violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages 
resulting from the violation.' 217 Hence, a human rights violation which is not 
directly imputable to the state can still trigger state responsibility because of 
the state's lack of 'due diligence' in preventing the violation or responding to it 
adequately 218 This duty to act includes not only reasonable prevention and 
investigation of alleged incidents, but also the establishment of a system of 
criminal law under which the offenders may be prosecuted and punished 
adequately.219 
2
'
4 Janes claim (US v. Mexico), (1926) 4 RIAA 82. 
m United States Diplomalic and Con~ular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Judgment of 24 May 1980, I.1980]1Cj 
Rep, 3, paras. 67, 69. 
m ECHR, ~upra note 39, Art. 1; Osman v. United Kingdom, [1998] 29 EHRR 245, para. 115; GOieo;; v. Tur"key, 
[1998] 28 EHRR 121, para. 77; Kelly et al, v. United Kingdom, [200'1] ECHR 240, para. 94; Mastromatteo 
v. ltctly, [2002] ECHR 689, para. 67. 
217 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, lnter·Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.4, (1988), para. 166. 
m Ibid., para. 172. 
219 Ibid., para. 166. 
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A responsibility to prevent non state entities and private individuals from 
subjecting others to slavery, the slave trade, slavery-like practices, and forced 
labour, as well as a duty to investigate alleged transgressions, could arise from 
the duty to ensure and protect human rights which appears in all the general 
human rights instruments discussed above.220 Moreover, many provisions in 
the anti-slavery and anti-forced-labour conventions also impose specific 
obligations on states parties to prevent treaty violations by state and private 
actors alike, and to hold the perpetrators individually accountable. Article 1 of 
the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention provides a forceful example, 
obligating states parties 'to bring about ... the complete abolition' of all slavery-
! ike practices, including imposing criminal penalties for such conduct;"' Article 
25 of ILO Convention No. 29 commands state parties to make forced or 
compulsory labour as defined under the Convention punishable as a penal 
offence, and to ensure that penalties 'are really adequate and strictly enforced.'222 
Furthermore, the perpetration of the contemporary manifestations of slavery 
could engage state responsibility under several other human rights provisions 
which impose positive obligations, including the right to life;223 the right to 
freedom from torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;224 and 
the right to liberty and security. 225 
Under the rubric of positive obligations, then, the conduct of many of 
the organs of the Brazilian state and federal governments in respect of 
Amazonian forced labour may indeed give rise to state responsibility. The Inter-
American Commission made such a finding in the only inter-American decision 
thus far to deal with Brazilian forced labour, Pereira v. Brazil, mentioned above 
in Section 2. 226 When jose Pereira (then aged 17) and a co worker known as 
'Parana' attempted to flee from a fazenda in southern Para in 1989, fazenda 
thugs pursued the men, gunned them down, and left them for dead. Pereira 
220 ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 1; ACHR, suwa note 76, Art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 75, Art. 2. 
121 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 56, Arts. 1, 3, 6. 
112 ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 66, Art. 25. See also, e.g., ibid., Art. 4(1)-(2) (obliging states parties not 
to permit forced labour for the benefit of private individuals); ILO Convention No. 105, supra note 32, Art. 
2 (imposing duty on states parties to take 'effective measures' to secure the immediate and complete 
abolition of forced or compulsory labour as defined under the Convention); 1926 Slavery Convention, 
supra note 47, Art. 2(a) (obliging states '[t]o prevent and suppress the slave trade'). 
m ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 2; ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 75, Art. 6. See also Osman v. 
United Kingdom, supra note 216, paras. 115-116; Villagran Moralc~s et al. v. Guatemala, lnter"Am. Ct. 
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 54 (2001) (affirming Guatemala's positive obligation to create conditions so that 
violations of right to life in ACHR Article 4 do not occur). 
224 ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 3; ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 75, Art. 7. See also Z. et al. v. 
United Kingdom, !2001] 34 EHRR 3, para. 73 ('States [must] take measures designed to ensure that individuals 
within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill 
treatment administered by private individuals'). 
m ECHR, supra note 39, Art. 5; ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 7; lCCPR, supra note 75, Art. 9. See also Nielsen v. 
Denmark, [19881 144 ECHR (Ser. A), para. 64. 
216 See text accompanying notes 177-183, supra. 
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miraculously survived to tell his story to the CPT, which then reported what 
had happened to the appropriate authorities. Despite their knowledge of forced-
labour conditions on this particular fazenda through scores of complaints that 
had come in since at least 1987, the state and federal authorities, including the 
Federal Police, proceeded very sluggishly with their investigation. In the 
meantime the body of Parana disappeared along with other evidence implicating 
the perpetrators, and nine years after the incident, when the Commission 
rendered its decision, the only concrete judicial action that had taken place 
was the dropping of charges against a fazenda administrator due to the lapsing 
of the time limit for beginning criminal proceedings.227 
Invoking the Velasquez Rodriguez doctrine of due diligence, the 
Commission opined that the Brazilian state was responsible for violating several 
provisions of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, the ACHR 
as regards actions and omissions from Brazil's 1992 ratification of the 
Convention onwards, and obligations under the anti-slavery and anti-forced 
labour conventions to prosecute and punish private violations. 228 
The violated Declaration and Convention rights included the right to 
life, liberty, and security; 229 the right to free movement;230 the right to 
preservation of health;23 ' the right to work under proper conditions and with 
proper remuneration; 232 the right to leisure and advantageous use of free time; 233 
and the right to an effective judicial remedy to ensure respect for legal rights.234 
One state organ that the Commission determined to have engaged Brazil's 
responsibility was the national Congress, for its failure to organise Brazil's 
legislative apparatus to permit state and federal authorities to effectively prevent 
and punish situations of work oppression. 235 Other impugned authorities 
included the state and federal courts for violating the obligation to provide 
Pereira, Parana, and their fellow fazenda workers with an adequate judicial 
remedy, and the state and federal police for failing to undertake a proper 
investigation. 236 As discussed in Section 2, the Lula administration ultimately 
settled the Pereira case before proceedings began in the Inter-American Court. 237 
227 Pereira v. Brazil, Case 11,289, lnter"Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser/LN/11.102, doc. 28 (report no. 21/99) (1999), 
paras. 59-83. 
228 ibid., paras. 84-87. 
m 1948 American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, 2 May 1948, Art. I, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.Uv/ 
11.23/0oc.21/Rev.6 (1948). 
no Ibid., Art. VIII. 
m Ibid., Art. X!. 
232 Ibid., Art. XIV. 
m Ibid., Art. XV. 
234 Ibid., A11. XVIII; ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 25. 
235 Pereira v. Brazil, supra note 227, para. 93. 
no Ibid., paras. 102-04, 110-12 . 
. w See Lei no. 10.706, supra note 178. See also notes 177-183 and accompanying text, supra. 
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Although the Brazilian authorities' response to the forced-labour 
phenomenon has improved enormously since the 1989 attack on Pereira and 
even since the Commission's 1999 decision, many of the violations cited by 
the Commission persist today, including legislative and constitutional confusion 
as to which entity-the federal or state judiciary-is responsible for adjudicating 
charges of reducing someone to a condition analogous to slavery, insufficient 
investigations of forced-labour situations and prosecutions of fazendeiros, and 
the lack of a constitutional provision allowing for uncompensated 
expropriation. 238 
Indeed, Brazil still appears far from satisfying its extensive legal 
obligations as spelled out by the Commission, and many of the root causes 
behind these enduring stumbling blocks-such as de facto fazendeiro control 
over local mayors, police, and judicial authorities and the northern bias in 
Congress-seem unlikely to go away anytime soon regardless of condemnation 
by the Inter-American Commission and Court. The Brazilian state is simply 
incapable at this stage of its development to abide by all of its stringent 
obligations under international law in respect of forced labour, especially taking 
into consideration the abundance of arguably more pressing human rights crises 
elsewhere in the country and the extreme difficulty of monitoring and policing 
such remote and transitory activities. Subsection 3.2 of this article examines 
whether the individual perpetrators of forced labour could be held criminally 
responsible under international law for their acts, and whether individual 
responsibility could present a viable alternative to state responsibility. 
3.2. Individual international criminal responsibility for Brazilian forced labour 
3.2.1. Prosecution in national courts 
Section 1 of this article examined certain provisions in the anti-slavery 
and anti-forced-labour conventions, such as the duty to criminalise the conduct 
under national law and punish offenders, that provide strong evidence that 
slavery, the slave trade, slavery-like practices, and illegal forced labour constitute 
freestanding international crimes. 239 As mentioned in that section, 
notwithstanding the tendency of commentators on the Brazilian situation-
including many scholars, the IL0,'40 and even the government-to employ the 
terms 'slave labour,' 'escravidao', and 'escravatura', under international law 
the crime about which they are writing does not fit into the normative paradigm 
of slavery per se, nor does it constitute debt bondage in terms of the 1956 
Supplementary Slavery Convention. The proscription of slavery in the 1926 
ns 5("e notes 150·-·162, 169-176, 195-205 and accompanying text, supra. 
m St~e notes 105-115 and accompanying text, supra. 
240 See, e.g., International Labour Organization, supra note 20, at 74. 
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Slavery Convention contemplates legal ownership of the victim; 2" Brazilian 
law has prohibited one person from legally owning another since the abolition 
of slavery in 18882 " The 1956 Convention's definition of debt bondage, 
moreover, requires a voluntary pledge by the debtor of his services as security 
for an existing debt;''3 by contrast, Brazilian pe6es' debt arises only after they 
have begun work and are obliged to purchase food, clothing, and equipment 
on credit. 
The activities do, however, seem to fit squarely into the definition of 
illegal forced labour under Convention No. 29. The Convention considers 
labour 'forced' when it occurs under the menace of any penalty and the worker 
has not offered himself voluntarily,'" and the European Court of Human Rights 
has opined that involuntariness can come about not only through physical 
coercion, but also through psychological coercion. 245 While the peoes' initial 
decision to work may be voluntary, it becomes effectively involuntary when, 
to their surprise, they must work to liquidate a debt which began to accrue 
during the long journey out to the fazenda when the gato paid for their meals 
and lodging. The extreme isolation of most fazendas, the psychological trauma 
of skipping out on a debt, and the possibility of meeting the same fate as jose 
Pereira and his friend 'Parana' keep most pe6es from even considering escape. 246 
Additionally, none of the forced-labour norm's many exemptions apply to the 
Amazonian context: the work is not exacted pursuant to an emergency, for 
example, and does not form part of civic obligations, 247 and forced labour non 
public purposes is prohibited in any case. 248 
National criminal jurisdictions play the central role in the enforcement 
of international criminal law, acting on behalf of the international community 
to suppress criminal conduct which falls outside the very restricted scope of 
the international and internationalised criminal tribunals. Two powerful 
provisions of the anti-slavery conventions arguably permit the prosecution of 
Amazonian forced labour in foreign states' courts: first, when read in 
conjunction, Articles 5 and 6 of the 1926 Convention impose on states a duty 
to criminalise and prosecute any private use of forced labour249 and, secondly, 
Article 25 of Convention No. 29 requires states to crimina!ise, prosecute, and 
241 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 47, Art. 1 (1). See also notes 47" 50 and accompanying text, supra. 
2~2 lei no. 3353 de 1888 (known as the 'Lei Aurea'). 
243 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 56, Art 1 (a). 
"" ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 66, Art 2(1). 
m Van der Mussele v. Belgium, supra note 40, para. 34. 
2
"
6 See notes 10-13 and accompanying text, supra. 
241 See, e.g., ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 66, Art. 2(2)(d)-(e); ACHR, supra note 76, Art. 6(3)(c)-(d). 
248 ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 66, Art. 1 (2); 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 47, Arts. 5-6. 
24
'' Ibid. 
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punish the illegal exaction of forced labour-'50 In all probability, a state that 
enacts legislation allowing the prosecution of forced-labour perpetrators may 
exercise its jurisdiction over both domestic and extraterritorial violations as 
long as, in the latter scenario, the offender and/or the victim are nationals of 
that state. 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether such a state may permissibly 
exercise its jurisdiction absent a nexus of territoriality or nationality, as would 
be the case with a Brazilian fazendeiro suspected of subjecting his own 
countrymen to forced labour within the borders of Brazil. The anti-forced-
labour norm's probable failure to rise to the level of jus cogens/ 51 along with 
the absence of an aut dedere aut judicare provision in any of the relevant 
conventions (obliging states either to prosecute or to extradite offenders found 
within their borders), make it less likely that the norm carries permissive 
universal jurisdiction.252 Indeed, neither of the ILO forced-labour conventions 
nor even the 1926 Slavery Convention rank among Professor Bassiouni's list of 
slavery-related instruments with provisions bestowing universal jurisdiction.253 
Moreover, even if the anti-forced-labour norm does carry universal 
jurisdiction, states have overwhelmingly chosen not to exercise such 
jurisdiction-including over the core crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes 254-and most have not enacted the necessary 
legislation to allow for its exercise. 255 Prosecutions of foreigners for 
extraterritorial atrocities were almost unheard of until the 1990s and have been 
quite rare since. 256 Legislators and judges in Belgium and Spain have been the 
most pioneering in this regard/57 but even they have backed away in recent 
Nl ILO Convention No. 29, sup1·a note 66, Art 25. 
20
' See notes '102-103 and accompanying text, supra. 
202 See Ratner and Abrams, supra note 116, at 162. But see 55 Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 
10, at 18-19 (holding that a state may exercise its jurisdiction to prescribe anywhere in the wodd); Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium), judgment of 14 February 2002, [2002]1Cj Rep. 12·1 [hereinafter 
Arrest Warrant case], separate opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 51. 
153 M. C. Bassiouni, 'Unive1·sal jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary 
Practice', (2001) 42 Virginia journal of International Law 81, 112 Ihereinafter Bassiouni 20011. The list 
contains only two anti-slavery instruments, both dealing with the slave trade. See 1841 Treaty of London, 
supra note 46, Arts. VI, VI!, X; 1890 Brussels General Act, supra note 46, Art. V. 
2
"
4 Ratner and Abrams, supra note 116, at 185. 
"'' Bassiouni 2001 supra note 253, at 105-106. 
m See, e.g., AffJire Barbie (French Court of Cass<Jtion, Chambre Criminelle, 20 December 1985), 1985 Bull. 
Crim., No. 407, 1053; Affaire Touvier (French Court of Cassation, Chambre Criminelie, 27 November 
1992), 1992 Bull. Crim., No. 294, 1085; Public: Prosecutorv. Menten (Dutch Hoge Raad 1981), 75 !LR 362 
at 362-63; Regina v. Finta (Canadian Supreme Court 1994), 1 SCR 701, 814. 
157 See Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative a Ia repression des infractions graves aux Conventions internationaux de 
Gen6ve du 12 aoQt "1949 etaux Protocols I et II du 8 juin 1977, Additionnels aces Conventions, Moniteur 
beige, 5 August 1993; Chilean Genocide case (Spanish Audiencia Nacional, 5 November 1998), reprinted 
in R. Brody and M. Ratner (eds.), The Pinochet Papers: The Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain 
(2000). 
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years258 in response to international criticism concerning the precarious legal 
basis of pure universal jurisdiction and the wisdom of basing prosecutions on 
it. 259 Furthermore, the dearth of state practice in exercising universal jurisdiction 
over international crimes which have no nexus to the enforcing state militates 
strongly against the existence of such jurisdiction under customary international 
law, especially for a non jus cogens norm like that prohibiting forced labour.260 
3.2.2. Prosecution in the International Criminal Court 
Despite their ostensible role as the primary enforcers of international 
criminal law, states have failed overwhelmingly to play their part. To some 
extent in response to the woeful inadequacy of this envisaged indirect-
enforcement scheme, in recent years the international community has begun 
to resort to direct-enforcement schemes whereby an international court or 
tribunal may prosecute persons suspected of international crimes2f•l The ICC 
is the only international court with global reach and, as Brazil ratified the 
Rome Statute on 14 june 2002, the Court could conceivably exercise jurisdiction 
over forced-labour fazendeiros for the thousands of violations that have occurred 
since 1 September of that year (see Table, infra). 262 Because the atrocities at 
issue here are not committed in the context of armed conflict, the primary 
provision of the Rome Statute under which forced-labour perpetrators could 
be prosecuted is Article 7(1)(c), which sets forth the crime against humanity of 
enslavement. 263 
As discussed in Section 1, enslavement has appeared in every positive 
formulation of crimes against humanity since the Nuremberg Charter. 264 
Although few of the relevant instruments have provided a definition of the 
term or an enumeration of the activities it includes, Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome 
Statute defines enslavement for ICC purposes in language largely identical to 
that of the 1926 Slavery Convention: "'Enslavement" means the exercise of 
10~ See Guatemala Genocide case, Decision No. 327/2003 (Supreme Court of Spain, 25 February 2003), available 
at (2003) 42 ILM 686. See also N. Roht"Arraiza, 'Universal jurisdiction: Steps Fo1wa1·d, Steps Back', (2004) 
17 LJIL 375, 38s ..... J86 (discussing 2002 Sharon case in the Appeals Court of Brussels)_ 
159 See, e.g., H. Kissinger, 'The Pitfalls of Universal jmisdiction', Foreign Affairs, july-August 2001, 86; Arrest 
Warrant case, supra note 252, separate opinion of judge Guillaume, paras. 7·-8. 
200 See Bassiouni 2001, supra note 253, at 148. 
261 See M. C. Bassiouni, 'Enforcing Human Rights Through International Criminal Law and Through an 
International Criminal Tribunal', in L. Henkin and J. 1 ... Hargrove (eds.), Human Rights: An Agenda for the 
Next Century (1994), 347 at 356-358 [hereinafter Bassiouni 1994]. 
262 Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art. 126(1) ('This Statute shall ente1· into force on the first day of the month 
after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification'). See also http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/aspl0alesparties/country&id=28.html (listing dates of Bmzil's signature and ratification 
of Rome Statute). '.......... .. 
2
"3 Rome Statute, supra note 31,, Art. 7(1 )(c). 
26
" See notes 118-126 and accom'panying text, supra. 
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any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and 
includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children.'265 At the insistence of the United States and 
other delegations concerned that this definition was still excessively vague,'66 
the Elements of Crimes clarify that 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' 
could include 'purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, 
or . imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.'267 
Upon initial examination, these qualifications appear to restrict the scope 
of enslavement to trafficking and traditional chattel slavery, thereby excluding 
an abundance of modern slavery-related activities such as forced labour; the 
phrase 'similar deprivation of liberty' could have left the definition open to the 
misinterpretation that enslavement requires some sort of commercia! exchange. 
Many delegations at the drafting of the Elements opposed the illustrative list 
for precisely this reason, and after intense negotiations the delegates reached a 
compromise in the form of Canadian-proposed Footnote 11, providing that 
'[i]t is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, 
include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile 
status'."'' The end result-a restrictive-sounding list qualified by an expansive 
footnote-prompted Darryl Robinson to refer to the ICC's enslavement provision 
as 'convoluted and inelegant'.269 To be sure, though the footnote makes it 
clear that forced labour can amount to enslavement 'in some circumstances', 270 
This conclusion corresponds with that of Christopher Hall, who in his 
commentary to Article 7(1 )(c) and (2)(c) asserted as follows: 
It is logical to assume that the drafters wished the Court to 
have jurisdiction over other slavery-like practices such as 
serfdom and debt bondage, as well as related practices, such 
as forced or compulsory labour, as crimes against humanity, 
given the history of the struggle over more than 200 years to 
abolish slavery, slavery-like practices, and forced labour. 
2
"
5 Ibid., Art 7(2)(c). Cf. 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 47, Art. 1(1). 
266 Robinson, supra note 269, at 85. 
'c'7 ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 125, Art. 7(1 )(c), element 1. 
m Ibid., Art. 7(1 )(c), element 1 at n.11. 
269 D. Robinson, 'The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity', in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal 
Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2001), 85.C. K. Hall, 'Enslavement', in 
OUo Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the lnternationai Criminal Court: Observers' 
Notes, Article by Article (1999}, 132 at 134. 
2711 This conclusion corresponds with that of Christopher Hall, who in his commentary to Article l("I)(C) and 
(2)(c) asserted as follows; 
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it fails to specify what these circumstances might include. 
When faced with a concrete forced-labour case, the ICC will likely seek 
guidance in the case law of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals. As of 
October 2005 the chambers of the ICTY had had occasion to discuss the 
substance of the 'enslavement' provision in Article 5(c) of the ICTY Statute in 
only two cases: Kunarac in February 2001 271 and June 2002, 272 and Krnojelac 
in March 2002 273 and September 2003. 274 
No chamber of the ICTR had yet discussed the substantive elements of 
'enslavement' in Article 3(c) of that Tribunal's Statute as of October 2005 2 " 
In the absence of statutory language indicating the exact meaning and 
scope of enslavement in Article 5(c), Trial Chamber II in Kunarac and again in 
Krnoje/ac analysed the existing authorities on slavery and related activities 
under international law-including the anti-slavery and anti-forced-labour 
conventions, human rights and humanitarian law instruments, the Nuremberg 
Judgment, and judgments rendered after the Second World War pursuant to 
Control Council Law No. 1om'-in order to divine what it considered the 
customary international law definition of enslavement: 1the exercise of any or 
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.' 277 As held 
by the Kunarac Trial Chamber, 'the actus reus of the violation is the exercise of 
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person', and 
'the mens rea of the violation consists in the intentional exercise of such 
powers' 278 While the Trial Chamber obviously drew this language directly 
from the 1926 Slavery Convention, the Appeals Chamber emphasised that 
'enslavement' under customary international law at the time of the events in 
the former Yugoslavia encompassed not only chattel slavery, but also the slave 
trade, servitude, forced labour, and any other contemporary form of slavery 
271 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 45, p<nas. 515-343, 728-782. 
272 Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 45, paras. 106-124. 
173 Krnojelac Trial judgment, supr-a note 45, paras. 349-430. 
m Krnojelac Appeal judgment, supra note 45, paras. 189-207. 
m Indeed, besides Kunarac and Krnojelac, only one other judgment of either ad hoc Tribunal dedicates more 
than a passing reference to 'enslavement': the Simi::e Trial judgment invoked paragraph 523 of the Kunarac 
Trial judgment and paragraph 356 of the Krnojelac Trial judgment in support of its holding that both 
'slavery' as a violiltion of the lctws m customs of war (ICTY Statute Article 3) and 'enslavement' as a crime 
against humanity (ICTY Statute Article 5) 'require proof of the same elements[,] and both terms can be used 
interchangeably.' Pro~ecutor v. Simi::e, Tadice, and Zari::e, judgement, Case No. IT-95-9-T, 17 October 
2003, pard. 85 and p. 28 n.147. 
m Kunarac et al. Trial judgment, supra note 4.5, paras. 518-537; Krnojelac Trial judgment, supra note 45, 
paras. 352-353. 
m Kunarac et al. Trial judgment, supra note 45, para . .539. See also Kunarac et al. Appeal judgment, supra 
note 45, ara. 116; Krnojelac Trial Judgment, supra note 45, para. 358. 
278 Kunarac e1 aL Trial judgment, supra note 45, para. 540. See also Kunarac el al. Appeal Judgment, supra 
note 45, pa1·as. ·116, 122. 
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that involves 'some destruction of the [victim's] juridical personality'.279 In the 
Appeals Chamber's words, 'the destruction is greater in the case of "chattel 
slavery" but the difference is one of degree.'280 
The Trial Chamber convicted Dragoljub Kunarac of enslavement after 
finding that he had treated two girls that he had kept in an abandoned house 
for approximately six months 'as personal property': 'they had to do household 
chores and they had to obey all demands', including sexual demands.281 The 
Chamber additionally convicted Radomir Kovae under Article 5(c) 282 after 
finding that he had detained four women in an apartment, requiring them to 
'take care of the household chores, the cooking and the cleaning', 283 and that 
he had 'sold' two of them for DM 500 to unidentified Montenegrin soldiers.'" 
The Chamber concluded that Kovae had fulfilled the actus reus and mens rea 
of enslavement-that is, that he intentionally exercised powers attaching to the 
right of ownership over the women-in the following terms: 
m Ibid., para. 117. 
J~G \bid. 
The Trial Chamber finds that Radomir Kovae's conduct towards 
the two women was wanton in abusing and humiliating the four 
women and in exercising his de facto power of ownership as it 
pleased him. Kovae disposed of them in the same manner. For 
all practical purposes, he possessed them, owned them and had 
complete control over their fate, and he treated them as his 
property. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that Kovae exercised 
the above powers over the girls intentionally. The Trial Chamber 
is satisfied that many of the acts caused serious humiliation, of 
which the accused was aware.285 
2m Kunarac et al. Trial judgment, supra note 45, paras. 728-729, 739, 744-745. 
m Ibid., para. 782. 
m Ibid., paras. 7.51, 780. 
2111 Ibid., para. 775. 
ns Ibid., para. 781. 
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The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber's convictions of Kunarac 
and Kovae. 286 
As identified by the Trial Chamber in Krnojelac, and in line with both the text 
of ILO Convention No. 29287 and the European Court's holding in Van der Mussele 
v. Belgium,288 the touchstone for establishing that a given labour situation constituted 
enslavement is that the 'relevant persons had no real choice as to whether they 
would work.'289 In this vein the Trial Chamber in Kunarac held that, in a situation of 
enslavement, '[t]he consent or free will of the victim is absent','90 and this position 
was subsequently endorsed by the Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac: '[T]he 
"involuntariness" aspect [is] the definitional feature afforced or compulsory labour.'29 ' 
Yet while it acknowledged that involuntariness is the central factor that 
turns permissible labour into enslavement,292 the Appeals Chamber stressed in 
both Kunarac and Krnojelac that the prosecution need not establish that the 
particular victim in question in fact lacked the consent to work. 293 Consequently, 
the Krnojelac Appeals Chamber overruled the Trial Chamber's holding that the 
prosecution must prove, 'in every case', that 'the particular detainee had lost his 
choice to consent or to refuse the work he was doing.'294 The Prosecutor had 
charged Mil orad Krnojelac, the warden of a prison, with slavery-related activities 
in three separate counts of the indictment: Count 1 charged 'forced labour' as a 
predicate offence of persecution, a crime against humanity;295 Count 16 charged 
enslavement as a crime against humanity;296 and Count 18 charged 'slavery' as a 
violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3.297 The Trial Chamber 
acquitted Krnojelac on all three counts298 after finding that the prosecution had 
put forth insufficient evidence to prove that six of the eight victims in question 
individually lacked the consent to work299 Moreover, while the Chamber found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that guards in Krnojelac's prison had indeed 
compelled two of the detainees to do mine-clearing work against the detainees' 
286 Kunarac et al. Appeal judgment, supra note 45, para. 124. 
237 ILO Convention No. 29, surra note 66, Art. 2{1). See also notes 62, 89 and accompanying text, supra. 
lBs Vander Mussele v. Belgium, supra note 40, para. 34. See also Kunarac et al. Trial judgment, supra note 45, 
para. 535 (discussing Vander Mus~ele v. Belgium). 
289 Krnojelac Trial Judgment, supra note 45, para. 359. 
19° Kunarac et al. Trial judgment, supra. note 45, para. 542. 
291 Krnojelac Appeal judgment, supra note 45, para. 191. 
292 Ibid. 
2 ~ 1 Ibid.; Kunarac et al. Appeal judgment, supra note 45, para. 120. 
294 Kmojelac Trial judgment, supra note 45, para. 380 (emphasis added). 
w, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Third Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-97-25-1, 25 june 2001, para. 5.2(d) 
[hereinafter Krnojelac lndictrnenl]. See also IClY Statute, supra note 29, Art 5(h). 
296 Krnojelac Indictment, supra note 295, para. 5.46. See aiso JCTY Statute, supra note 29, Art. 5(c). 
197 Krnojelac Indictment, supra note 295, para. 5.46. See also ICTY Statute, supra note 29, Art. 3. 
' 9 ~ Krnojelac Trial judgment, supw note 45, paras. 425-430, 471. 
299 See ibid., paras. 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 395. 
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will, 300 it nevertheless concluded that Krnojelac could not be held responsible as 
the guards' superior because the prosecution had failed to prove that he knew or 
should have known of this particular forced-labour situation 3 " 
In overturning the Trial Chamber's acquittal of l<rnojelac on Count 1, the 
Appeals Chamber held that, 'given the specific detention conditions of the non 
Serb detainees at [Krnojelac's prison] the KP Dom, a reasonable trier of fact 
should have arrived at the conclusion that the detainees' general situation negated 
any possibility of free consent.'302 In other words, because '[t]he climate offear at 
the prison made the expression of free consent impossible', any labour performed 
by any detainee was per se involuntary regardless of whether the detainee 
volunteered for the job, for example, to have more freedom or in the hope of 
obtaining additional food or cigarettes. 101 The Appeals Chamber thus concluded 
that all eight of the detainees in question had indeed been 'forced to work' 
notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to prove that six of the individuals in 
fact lacked the consent to work. 304 After finding that Krnojelac had participated 
in a joint criminal enterprise to persecute the eight detainees, the Chamber entered 
a conviction for forced labour as a form of persecution under Article 5(h) 305 
Since the prosecution curiously did not appeal the Trial Chamber's acquittal of 
Krnojelac on Counts 16 (enslavement under Article S(c)) and 18 (slavery under 
Article 3), the Appeals Chamber left these acquittals intact/06 and as a result only 
two persons-Kunarac and Kovae-have thus far been convicted in the ad hoc 
Tribunals of enslavement as a crime against humanity. 
While both the Trial and Appeals Chambers declined to enumerate 
exhaustively all of the contemporary forms of slavery that 'enslavement' comprehends, 
they provided the following list of 'indicia of enslavement'307 to be weighed in each 
case to determine whether the accused exercised any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over the victim: (1) the substantial lack of compensation; 
(2) the vulnerable position of the worker; (3) that the worker was detained; (4) the 
inhumane workconditions;308 (5) the duration of the relationship between the accused 
and the victim; 309 (6) the exercise of control over the worker's movement and physical 
environment; (7) deception or false promises; (8) that measures were taken to prevent 
300 Ibid., paras. 4"10-411. 
10
' Ibid., para. 429. See also ICTY Statute, supra note 29, Art 7(3) (setting forth the doctrine of superior 
responsibility). 
'
02 Krnojeiac Appeal judgment, supr·a note 45, para. 194. 
303 Ibid., paras. 194-195. 
304 Ibid., para. 19/?. 
10
' Ibid., paras. 199-203, 206-207, pp. 113-114. 
JO(, See ibid., paras. 189-190. 
307 Kunarac et al. Appeal judgment, supra note 45, para. 119. 
308 Krnojelac Trial Judgment, supm note 45, para. 373. 
309 Kunarac et al. Appeal judgment, supra note 45, para. 121. 
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or deter escape, including psychological coercion and the threat of force; and (9) that 
the worker was subjected to cruel treatment. 310 The acquisition or disposal of the 
worker for monetary or other compensation is decidedly not an element that the 
prosecution must establish to secure a conviction under Article S(c) although, as the 
Kunarac Trial Chamber pointed out, '[djoing so ... is a prime example of the exercise 
of the right of ownership over someone.'l11 
Remarkably, nearly all of these indicia of enslavement characterise forced 
labour in the Amazonian context: the workers are lured to the fazenda under false 
pretences; they seldom manage to pay off their debt and thus never receive 
remuneration; their work conditions are dangerous and their housing conditions 
subhuman; and armed guards, psychological coercion, and the foreboding physical 
environment keep the workers from fleeing. Furthermore, since the individual victim's 
lack of consent need not be proven in order to establish the crime against humanity 
of enslavement-at least as construed in the case law of the ICTY-even the 40 
percent of Brazilian peoes previously freed by labour inspectors, and who have 
chosen to return to work at the same or another fazenda, can potentially qualify as 
victims of enslavement."' just as the subhuman conditions and climate of fear in 
Krnojelac's prison vitiated any consent to work that the detainees may have manifested, 
a sound argument could be made that labour performed on remote fazendas in hot, 
dangerous, and disease-ridden conditions, with no protective gear and under the 
constant vigilance of gunmen, is per se involuntary and thus unlawful. 
In order for the prosecution to prevail on a charge of enslavement under 
the Rome Statute, it must also establish the general elements of crimes against 
humanity as set forth in the chapeau of Article 7(1): the enslavement must be 
'committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population', and the individual perpetrator must have knowledge of 
such attack. 313 Article 7(2)(a) and the Elements of Crimes clarify that the required 
'attack' need not be military in character; 314 to be sure, crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute, as under customary international law and in the ICTR 
Statute, need not have any connection to an armed conflict whatsoever, and need 
not even be carried out by means of violence.315 The attack must, however, be either 
'widespread' (defined by the Akayesu Trial Chamber of the ICTR as 'massive, frequent, 
large-scale action' against 'a multiplicity of victims' 316) or 'systematic' (defined as 
'following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy and involving substantial 
Jw Kunarac el al. Trial judgment, supra note 45, paras. 542-543; Kunarac et al. Appeal judgment, supra note 
45, paras. 119-120. 
111 Kunarac et aL T1·ial judgment, supra note 45, para. 542. 
112 S(ee notes 10-16, 145--148 and accompanying text, supra. 
m Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art. 7(1 ). 
nr. Ibid., Art. 7(2)(a). See also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 125, Introduction to Art. 7, element 3. 
:"5 Robinson, supra note 269, at 62, 74. 
3
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public or private resources'317), and it must involve the 'multiple commission' of 
offences 'pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy.'318 
As Robinson explains, 'multiple commission' of offences constitutes 
something less than 'widespread', and the requisite state or organisational policy 
need not be formalised, may come from either a state or a non-state organisation, 
and need not possess the 'very high degree of organization or orchestration' 
called for by the term 'systematic' 3 " 
When attempting to establish these elements in respect of an accused forced-
labour fazendeiro, the prosecution could argue that the 'attack' on the civilian pe6es 
is widespread: even the estimates admitted to by the Brazilian government reveal 
that, despite recent progress in freeing workers, tens of thousands of civilians (including 
an estimated half of the entire adult male population of the state of Piauf320) are still 
subjected to forced labour on hundreds of fazendas all across the southern arc of the 
Amazon basin, and such has been the case for at least 30 years; this reality surely 
satisfies Article 7(2)(a)'s 'multiple commission' criterion as well. And although the 
government officially opposes forced labour, the pervasive fazendeiro network-
including, among many others, complicit federal deputies and senators, governors, 
mayors, and state and federal police-evinces at the very least a de facto organisational 
policy to perpetuate the forced-labour status quo. Moreover, it should not be hard to 
prove in a given case that an accused forced-labour fazendeiro had knowledge of 
the attack: while few ordinary Brazilians in the densely populated central and southern 
regions are aware that forced labour exists in their country, individual fazendeiros 
certainly appreciate the critical role that such labour plays in the economy of the 
northern region and in the maintenance of their personal wealth.m 
A final but critically important hurdle that the prosecution must overcome 
before the ICC can declare a forced-labour case admissible will be to establish 
that the Brazilian state is either unwilling or unable-through the 'total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial systern'-to 
undertake such prosecutions on its own. 122 Recall that only two out of hundreds 
of fazendeiros have been convicted thus far of forced-labour crimes, and that 
neither of these men has spent a day in jail; this unhappy reality supplies strong 
circumstantial evidence of the unwillingness of state and federal prosecutors 
and judges to undertake such prosecutions or to allow thern to go forward. In 
addition, the consistent stance of the federal trial and appellate courts of the 
northern region that the crime of reducing someone to a condition analogous 
to slavery does not fall under federal jurisdiction, as well as the atmosphere of 
coercion and assassinations that plagues prosecutors and judges, 323 supports 
Jii Ibid. 
318 Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art. 7(2)(a). 
3
'
9 See D. Robinson, 'Defining "Crimes Against Humanity'' at the Rome Conference', (1999) 93 Ajll43, 48--51. 
-'
2D Rezende, supra note 10, at 112. 
321 See Bales, supra note 7, at 125, 147, 236. See also notes 21--22 and accompanying text, supra. 
312 See Rome Statute, supra note 31, Arts. 17, 15(3), 53(1). 
l.lJ See notes 151-156, 191-205 and accompanying text, supra. 
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the proposition that the national judicial system of the portion of Brazil where 
forced labour occurs has been rendered substantially unavailable 324 
Conclusion: International criminal law as the ultima ratio 
modality of human rights protection 
Despite states' almost universal condemnation of slavery, the slave trade, 
slavery-like practices, and forced labour, such activities are decidedly not yet relics 
of the past. The very real depredations suffered by rural workers in the north of 
Brazil provide just one of many examples of how the classic modality of human 
rights protection-state civil responsibility-has thus far failed to deal satisfactorily 
with the world's modern manifestations of slavery. 
Notwithstanding the existence of positive obligations on states to ensure to 
all within their jurisdiction the effective enjoyment of certain human rights/25 
human rights law quite often falls short in respect of violations perpetrated by 
private individuals-especially when carried out in remote areas outside the reach 
of the state apparatus-and in such cases international criminal law can serve a 
crucial gap-filling function. Professor Bassiouni has characterised resort to criminal 
proscription as the 'ultima ratio' modality of human rights protection, resorted to 
when other modalities of protection prove inadequate to remedy or provide redress 
for a given class or circumstance of offences. 326 International criminalisation is 
thus situated at the far end of a continuum consisting of five stages: enunciation 
(the emergence of shared values); declaration (the identification of specific rights); 
prescription (the enshrinement of normative proscriptions in international 
instruments); enforcement; and, ultimately, criminalisation if and when the 
modalities of protection of the other stages fall short. Because governments have 
predictably been loath to censure themselves and their own agents and organs, 
Bassiouni blames the momentous deficiencies of the state-responsibility modality 
on the fact that the majority of human rights abuses in the world are perpetrated by 
public or quasi public officials acting under colour of state authority.327 
Bassiouni's human rights continuum provides a useful tool for analysing 
the effectiveness of international law's enforcement modalities in respect afforced 
labour in Brazil. The norms outlawing the slave trade and slavery were among the 
very first to emerge and achieve positive formulation in what today can be thought 
of as prototypical human rights treaties, followed in short order by prohibitions on 
related institutions such as forced labour. These various instruments enjoy wide 
ratification and form part of customary international law, binding all states under 
menace of civil liability and opprobrium by the international community. Even 
after noteworthy efforts by the Brazilian government under Presidents Cardoso 
124 See Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art. 17(3). See also ICC Office of the Prosecutor {ed.), Informal Expert 
Paper: The Pl"inciple of Complementarity in Practice (2003), paras. 44 ..... 50 (on fi!e with author). 
m See text accompanying notes 214-237, supra. 
3
'b Bassiouni 1982, supra note 212, at 193; Bassiouni 1994, supra note 261, at 354. 
m See Bassiouni 1982, supra note 212, at 193-196. See also Bassiouni 1994, supra note 261, at 354. 
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and Lula to establish mechanisms to bring about the eradication of Amazonian 
forced labour, Brazil faces civil liability for its ongoing failure to prevent a whole 
host of violations of the anti-forced-labour norm. This glaring insufficiency of the 
state-responsibility modality of enforcement militates strongly in favour of 
international criminal accountability for fazendeiros and their henchmen. 
In order for Bassiouni's theory to accurately explain the Brazilian scenario, 
however, a slight modification would appear necessary. As discussed in Sections 2 
and 3, the malfunction of the state-responsibility scheme in the case of Brazilian 
forced labour has not come about because of the federal government's resistance to 
sanctioning its own commission of forced labour, but because of its lack of effective 
control over the activities of private individuals and those under such individuals' 
influence. The drafters of the Rome Statute seem to have had both scenarios in mind 
when devising the alternative admissibility criteria of 'unwillingness' and 'inability': 328 
cases declared admissible due to the state's unwillingness to prosecute will typically 
involve accused who committed their alleged crimes under the colour of state 
authority, and those declared admissible because of inability will quite often involve 
private individuals-such as terrorists and traffickers in women and children-over 
whom the state in question has little or no control. 
Since the inception of the International Criminal Court, the Prosecutor has 
seriously considered or begun investigations in just five situations-in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Ivory Coast, the Central African 
Republic, and Sudan-all in Africa and all involving societies engaged in arrned 
conflict. Nevertheless, although the crimes-against-humanity formulations in the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters and the ICTY Statute call for sorne sort of linkage 
to an arrned conflict/29 none of the other relevant instruments-including the ICTR 
and Rome Statutes~contains such a requirement, 330 nor does customary 
international law33 ' The ICC has been in existence for more than three years and 
the Prosecutor, struggling with investigations in adverse conditions in Uganda and 
the Congo, has only recently issued his first five indictments.332 For fear that states' 
enthusiasm for the Court may wane and funds and support may be withdrawn, it 
would appear incumbent upon the Prosecutor to consider the great multitude of 
atrocities being committed on the territory of states parties that, while perhaps less 
sensational than the armed-conflict crimes in Sudan or Uganda, are still highly 
odious and should prove much rnore susceptible to investigation and the rapid 
construction of a prosecution case. The enslavement of thousands of workers on 
hundreds of fazendas across the Brazilian Amazon would seem to be replete with 
concrete cases that could serve to get the ICC off the ground. 
328 Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art. 17. 
329 Nurembr-~rg Charter, supra note 41, Ari. 6(c); fokyo Charter, supra note 42, Art 5(c); ICTY Statute, supra 
note 29, Art. 5. 
m See ICTR Statute, supri'l note 30, Art. 3; Rome Statute, supra note 31, Art 7(1 ). 
13
' See Prosecutor v. Tadi<E, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, Case No. 
IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 141. 
m 'Catching a Ugandan Monster', Economist, 22 October 2005, 46 (stating that the ICC has issued arrest 
warrants for joseph Kony and four other Lord's Resistance Army leaders). 
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